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iAbstract
This thesis examines the role of corporate debt financing for the real economy.
First, I study the conditional dynamics of the external finance premium using US
data and find that the premium is countercyclical following supply and monetary
policy shocks. Second, I analyze to which extent bank and bond financing affect the
transmission of economic shocks in the context of a DSGE model. To the extent
that large firms predominantly use capital market finance, whereas small firms rely
on bank loans, the model predicts that the composition of corporate debt is relevant
for the propagation of shocks. Contractionary monetary policy and financial shocks
impair the ability of leveraged banks to provide loans, which adversely affects small
firms. Bond financing dependent firms can nevertheless issue bonds in times of
rising bond finance premia. These firms do not reduce their investments as strongly
as bank financing dependent firms. As a consequence, the economy that relies only
on bank credit is affected more by shocks than the economy with bank and bond
finance. Finally, the model is used to evaluate the optimal mix of conventional,
unconventional and macroprudential policies for segmented credit markets. I find
that the optimal policy mix attains the highest welfare gains following financial
shocks.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit der Rolle der Unternehmenskreditfinanzierung fu¨r
die Realwirtschaft. Im ersten Teil untersuche ich die Entwicklung der externen
Finanzierungspra¨mien in den USA in Folge von o¨konomischen Schocks und finde,
dass die Pra¨mie antizyklisch auf Angebots- und moneta¨re Schocks reagiert. Im
zweiten Teil analysiere ich mit Hilfe eines DSGE-Modells, wie die Zusammen-
fassung aus Bankkreditfinanzierung und Anleihenfinanzierung die Transmission
von o¨konomischen Schocks beeinflusst. Angenommen, dass große Unternehmen
gro¨ßtenteils Anleihenma¨rkte verwenden und kleine Unternehmen auf Bankkredite
angewiesen sind, zeigt das Modell, dass die Zusammensetzung des Unternehmen-
skreditfinanzierung relevant fu¨r die Verbreitung von Schocks ist. Negative moneta¨re
Schocks und Finanzschocks beeintra¨chtigen die Kreditvergabe von fragilen Banken,
die in Folge die Bankkredite an kleine Unternehmen ku¨rzen. Unternehmen, die
auf Anleihenfinanzierung zuru¨ckgreifen ko¨nnen, ko¨nnen sich in Zeiten steigen-
der Pra¨mien u¨ber Unternehmensanleihen refinanzieren. Daher reduzieren diese
Unternehmen nicht in so starken Ausmaß ihre Investitionen wie kleine Firmen.
Als Folge davon, ist eine Volkswirtschaft, die nur auf Bankkredite angewiesen ist,
sta¨rker von Schocks betroffen als eine Volkswirtschaft mit sowohl Bank- als auch
Anleihenfinanzierung. Abschließend wird das Modell verwendet, um eine Kombi-
nation konventioneller und unkoventioneller Geldpolitik sowie makroprudentieller
ii
Politik in einer O¨konomie mit segmentierten Kreditma¨rkten zu evaluieren. Es wird
gezeigt, dass der optimale Politikmix die ho¨chsten Wohlfahrtsgewinne in Folge von
Finanzschocks erreicht.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 showed how a severe financial crisis can have
overwhelming effects on the real economy, causing a deep contraction of output all
around the world. It also shaped macroeconomics, by drawing the close attention of
researchers and policy makers to the center of the crisis, the financial sector. In the
aftermath of the Great Recession, numerous theoretical and empirical frameworks
have been developed to analyze the role of financial markets for the real economy.
In empirical work, the effects of shocks originating in the financial sector have been
quantified.1 In theoretical work, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models now feature financial frictions, that amplify the propagation of economic
shocks on the real economy in order to mimic the financial crisis.2. Regarding
policy analysis, different policy measures, including conventional monetary policy,
unconventional policy and macroprudential policy, have been proposed to mitigate
the effects of financial shocks. An ongoing research in macroeconomics tries to
understand the interactions between the real economy and the financial sector, as
well as optimal policy response to changes in financial conditions. The purpose of
this thesis is to expand the ongoing research on financial frictions, financial shocks
and credit market factors.
Within the paradigm by Modigliani and Miller (1958) on the irrelevance of
the financial structure, the real economy is insulated from conditions in financial
markets. As argued by Bernanke et al. (1999), this irrelevance proposition ceases to
hold if financial markets feature frictions such as asymmetric information and moral
hazard problems. Hence, many DSGE models now incorporate financial frictions in
order to understand the role of financial markets in the propagation of business
cycle fluctuations. Despite extensive research on financial markets and financial
frictions, there is still no workhorse model with financial frictions that is supported
by data. This dissertation tries to shed some light on which financial frictions are
1See, e.g., Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012); Meeks (2012); Furlanetto et al. (2014) among others.
2See, e.g., Gertler and Karadi (2011); Christiano et al. (2014); Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013);
Gerali et al. (2010), to name a few.
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relevant and should, hence, be embedded in theoretical models.
Credit slump is often at the center of financial crisis - credit conditions worsen,
firms go bankrupt in the absence of financing opportunities or due to costly external
finance, and banks renege on the role of financial intermediation. Unavailability of
credit can hinder firms from undertaking investment projects and can enhance a
contraction of output at times of financial crisis. Providing stylized facts on the
US corporate credit market during the Great Recession, Adrian et al. (2012) and
Bekaert et al. (2013) document a surge in corporate bonds issuance and a decline
in bank lending, and suggest that a change in the composition of corporate credit
is an important dimension of the latest crisis. Motivated by the empirical evidence,
a DSGE model is developed to understand to what extent cyclical variations in
corporate debt affect the transmission of shocks.
In recent years central banks around the world have tried to tackle conditions
in the afflicted asset markets using both conventional and unconventional policy
measures. Addressing the expansion of central banks’ balance sheets, Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2011) showed that the optimal policy should be tailored to the degree
of a disruption in the relevant financial market as well as to a type of financial
disturbance. To challenge this result, I use my model economy with two credit
market segments for a welfare analysis of conventional and unconventional central
bank’s policies.
In the second chapter of this thesis, I conduct an empirical analysis of the ex-
ternal finance premium (EFP) using the US data, and find that the countercyclical
EFP is consistent with an important subset of financial frictions models. In the
third chapter, based on the empirical evidence, I propose a DSGE model to analyze
the role of bank and non-bank corporate debt for business cycle fluctuations. I
argue that the change in corporate debt composition attenuates the effects of shocks
on investment and output. In the fourth chapter, I analyze optimal central bank’s
policy setup within the context of the same model and show that the benefits
from the optimal policy response are large in the presence of economy-wide shocks.
However, this result is partly reversed in the presence of sector-specific financial
shocks.
The second chapter,“A structural empirical analysis of the external finance
premium”, analyzes the conditional dynamics of the external finance premium
(EFP) using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model. I find a common
denominator from DSGE models with financial frictions in order to impose a set
of signs restrictions that exclusively identify macroeconomic and financial shocks.
My results indicate that the corporate credit spread, a proxy for the EFP, is
countercyclical conditional on the realization of aggregate supply and monetary
policy shocks. Then, I confront my empirical evidence with the predictions from
financial DSGE models to answer the following questions: What is the relevant
3financial friction? Which modeling framework is favored by the data? The answer
is that various prominent financial DSGE models are consistent with my empirical
evidence. Financial DSGE models featuring different financial frictions (e.g., moral
hazard, costly state verification, collateral constraints) generate a countercyclical
EFP following supply shocks and monetary policy shocks. This empirical evidence
motivates modeling choices made in the following chapter.
In the third chapter, “Corporate debt composition and business cycles”, I
develop a theoretical framework to analyze the role of bank and bond finance in
the propagation of macroeconomic and financial shocks. In particular, I incorpo-
rate relevant financial frictions from the first chapter into a medium-scale DSGE
model, where leveraged banks, modeled along the lines of Gertler and Karadi
(2011), supply loans to small firms and mutual funds, specified as in Bernanke
et al. (1999), provide bond financing to large firms. Within this setup, I ask the
following questions: To what extent does the corporate debt composition (bank
versus bond finance) affect the transmission of macroeconomic and financial shocks?
Is a bank-dependent economy more adversely inflicted by shocks? To explain the
role of the corporate debt composition, I compare an economy consisting only of a
banking sector with an economy featuring bond and bank markets. I document
attenuated effects of contractionary monetary and financial shocks on investments
in the economy with the heterogeneous corporate debt structure. The reason is
to be found in the workings of the bank lending channel and the capital market
channel. The bank lending channel highlights the role of loan supply restrictions for
small firms, which in turn strongly reduce their investments. The capital market
finance channel signals the availability of external debt for large firms in exchange
for higher bond finance premia. As unconstrained mutual funds provide financing
to large firms, these firms do not reduce their investments as strongly as small
firms. As a consequence, the economy that relies only on bank finance is affected
more by monetary and financial shocks than the economy with bank and bond
finance. The model presents one theoretical mechanism that explains why financial
shocks have stronger short-term real effects in Europe than in the US (as reported
by Gambetti and Musso, 2017).
The fourth chapter,“An optimal policy mix for segmented credit markets”,
provides a normative analysis of central bank’s policies. In recent years central
bank policy instruments have expanded to include unconventional policy measures
to address disrupted credit markets (e.g., during the Great Recession) and macro-
prudential frameworks to tackle future risks emanating from these markets. As
argued by Cu´rdia and Woodford (2011), central banks’ policies should be tailored
to address severely disrupted financial markets. How should monetary policy be
conducted in an environment with two credit market segments? Using the model
presented in the third chapter, I evaluate the welfare performance of conventional
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monetary policy rules and a policy combination of conventional, unconventional
and macroprudential policies. How important is it that the central bank conducts
the optimal policy? Obviously, it is very important, in the case of economy-wide
financial shocks. Along the lines of the literature featuring only one financial market
(see, e.g., Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2010; Gertler et al., 2012; Bailliu et al., 2015) the
finding of large benefits of non-standard policies continues to hold in the model
with segmented credit markets. Within the context of my model, by addressing a
specific credit market segment with the policy tool at disposal, the central bank
achieves a more desirable macroeconomic outcome than it would by using only
conventional monetary policy. The stabilization effects arise from intervening in
the more disrupted credit market and combating negative effects of shocks in the
market where they arise. My further contribution to the literature concerns welfare
implications of sectoral financial shocks. How large are the mistakes that a policy
maker commits if she does not identify the source of a sectoral financial shock?
Surprisingly, the mistakes are small in comparison to the optimal policy response, if
the policy maker assumes that both credit markets are affected by financial shocks
and conducts her optimal policy accordingly. Is the source of sectoral financial
shocks important for the optimal policy? Counterintuitively, within my framework,
there are also shocks that leave the central bank helpless.
The thesis attempts to improve the understanding of credit markets using
state-of-the art macroeconomic models along three major dimensions: First, my
empirical evidence helps discriminate among financial friction models. Second, the
theoretical framework offers one explanation for why the composition of corporate
debt is relevant for economic fluctuations. Third, optimal policy decisions are
evaluated for the economy featuring two segmented credit markets.

Chapter 2
A structural empirical analysis of
the external finance premium
Abstract
I use an SVAR with sign restrictions to provide conditional evidence
on the behavior of the US external finance premium (EFP).
Importantly, the SVAR is identified in a theory-consistent manner.
The results indicate that the corporate credit spread, a proxy for the
EFP, reacts countercyclically to supply and monetary policy shocks.
I confront my empirical evidence with the predictions from financial
DSGE models with respect to the finance premium. Therefore,
the results add empirical discipline to the modeling of financial
frictions. Major financial frictions models (e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999;
Gertler and Karadi, 2011) generate transmission mechanisms that
are consistent with the data.
Keywords: External finance premium, business cycles, struc-
tural vector autoregression, sign restrictions
JEL Classification: E32, E44
2.1 Introduction
In recent years numerous theoretical frameworks have been developed to analyze the
role of financial markets for the real economy. Such models use financial frictions to
generate an endogenous external finance premium (henceforth, EFP), i.e., a wedge
between the external and internal costs of financing. Most financial DSGE models
emphasize the role of the premium in propagating shocks (see, e.g., Bernanke et al.,
1999; DeGraeve, 2008; Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2011; Kaihatsu and Kurozumi, 2014,
among others), however, they come to different results regarding the cyclicality of
the premium. In contrast to the prominent role of the EFP in theoretical models,
5
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little empirical evidence on EFP has been provided.1 This paper fills the gap in
the empirical literature by analyzing the conditional dynamics of the US external
finance premium in an SVAR with sign restrictions.
My results indicate that a countercyclical EFP arises in response to supply and
monetary policy shocks. The results are robust to the use of different proxies for
the EFP, i.e., different corporate credit spreads. The empirical evidence on the
EFP can be used as a guidance for gaining insights about which theoretical models
are in line with the data. The findings indicate that various types of financial
frictions (costly state verification framework a` la Townsend (1979), moral hazard
or collateral constraints) generate transmission mechanisms that are consistent
with my estimated dynamic consequences of shocks with respect to the EFP. In
a nutshell, the propagation mechanism arising in these financial DSGE models is
the following: A negative comovement between the EFP and output conditional on
technology shocks arises because inflation reacts countercyclically, which leads to a
countercyclical development of leverage and the EFP. An unexpected monetary
tightening decreases aggregate demand, which together with the decline in the
price of capital and the higher value of debt, results in an increase in the EFP
(making it countercyclical).
The role of credit spread movements in the US business cycles has been addressed
in the recent literature.2 Taking credit spreads as a measure of the EFP, my analysis
extends the literature along two dimensions: First, financial shocks (i.e., shocks to
the EFP) are identified and disentangled from macroeconomic shocks (aggregate
supply and monetary policy shocks) in a theory-consistent manner. My structural
approach is based on the common denominator from various DSGE frameworks
modeling financial frictions. This means that a minimal set of sign restrictions
shared by the models is used to exactly identify each shock. The studies of Gilchrist
and Zakrajˇsek (2012) and Meeks (2012) focus solely on credit market disturbances.
Second, theoretical models do not provide a consensus on how the finance premium
should respond to macroeconomic shocks and, therefore, my conditional empirical
analysis is informative in this respect, i.e., it aims at identifying an empirically
relevant financial frictions model for studying interactions between the real and
financial side of the economy. In doing so, I add some empirical discipline on the
modeling of financial frictions.
The novelty of the analysis is the focus on the dynamics of the EFP conditional
1Unconditionally, proxies of the premium are countercyclical indicators. Empirical studies by
Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) and Hristov et al. (2012), among others, document a rise in the
finance premium following negative financial shocks.
2See, e.g., Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012); Meeks (2012); Gertler and Lown (2000) among
others. The identified credit spread shocks have the nature of credit supply shock, i.e., credit
volume and the price of credit move in the opposite directions (see Gambetti and Musso, 2017;
Hristov et al., 2012). For efficiency reasons, my small-scale SVAR does not include a loan rate
and concentrates instead on the corporate borrowing costs relative to a certain reference rate.
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on identified structural shocks. To the best of my knowledge, the only paper
exploring the behavior of the EFP in response to multiple shocks is the work
by Furlanetto et al. (2014). Despite differences in the identification,3 my results
confirm the findings by Furlanetto et al. (2014) regarding the countercyclicality of
the EFP conditional on supply shocks. However, along the lines of monetary policy
shocks, my results differ from theirs. Unlike the authors, I use the conditional
dynamics of the EFP to infer which financial frictions models match the empirical
evidence. In this respect, my results are good news for those DSGE models (see,
e.g., Gertler and Karadi, 2011; DeGraeve, 2008; Gerali et al., 2010) which generate
a rise in the premium conditional on supply and monetary policy shocks. However,
frameworks with nominal optimal debt contracts (e.g., Christensen and Dib, 2008)
or heterogeneous financing needs by (e.g., Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2010) imply
transmission mechanisms that are not favored by my empirical evidence.
The remainder of the paper is organized along the following lines. Section 2
discusses the model specification. Section 3 presents the main results and the
robustness analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Model specification
2.2.1 Methodology and data
A VAR model is given by:
xt = A+B(i)xt−i + ut, (2.1)
where xt is a N × 1 vector containing N endogenous variables, A is N × 1 vector
of constants, B(i) for i = 1, . . .M represents N ×N coefficient matrices for lag i,
M is the number of lags and ut is the N × 1 one-step ahead prediction error with
a variance-covariance matrix of size N × N . The SVAR methodology with sign
restrictions follows the work by Uhlig (2005) and Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010) and
is summarized in appendix A.
In my structural model specification, vector xt contains six variables:
xt = [yt, pt, rt, crt, EFPt, qt], (2.2)
whereby, yt represents the real GDP in period t, pt the GDP deflator, rt the federal
funds rate, crt the credit volume, EFPt the external finance premium and qt
3Whereas asset price shocks of Furlanetto et al. (2014) cause investment and stock market
booms with a positive price reaction (i.e., demand-side financial shocks) adverse credit spread
shocks in my identification cause both a credit crunch and a stock market bust with an ambiguous
effect on inflation. Since I do not specify the price reaction a priori, the financial shock can be
either a demand or supply-side disturbance in my SVAR.
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the price of capital. The VAR specification includes a constant and three lags of
endogenous variables in the baseline model.4 The model is estimated for the US
with data in logs from 1973Q1-2010Q3. The federal funds rate and the EFP are
reported in levels.
The set of financial indicators is supposed to be representative for stock and
credit markets. The S&P500 stock market index is used as a proxy for the price
of capital (c.f., Bassett et al., 2014; Christiano et al., 2010, 2014). The price of
capital is one of the major determinants of net worth of firms in theoretical models,
which is empirically identified with the value of equity, i.e., the stock market index.
Following Christiano et al. (2014), the price of capital and the value of equity are
the identical concepts in the data. The empirical counterpart for total lending to
firms in theoretical models is represented by the amount of credit to the corporate
nonfinancial sector.
The external finance premium is the key variable in the process of credit
intermediation. It is not observable5 and therefore it is hard to measure. As argued
by Gertler and Lown (2000), it would be useful to have data on the individual
bank loan rates from US firms, since this would allow researchers to obtain a good
measure of external financing costs. Unfortunately, this data is not available. The
available bank rate represents a rate posted by banks, i.e., it is not determined by the
market. For these reasons, most researchers gather the market data from corporate
bond yields to infer a proxy for the premium. Credit spreads are commonly used as
measures of the EFP: the spread between yields on BAA- and AAA-rated corporate
bonds (i.e., the BAA-AAA spread), the spread between yields on BAA-rated
corporate bonds and 10-year-Treasury yields (i.e., the BAA-10Tr spread), the high-
yield spread, to name a few. One of prominent proxies for the premium is the spread
index developed by Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) (henceforth, GZ credit spread).
By matching individual corporate bond yields with their reference interest rate of
the appropriate maturity, the authors provide a good measure of external financing
costs for corporate firms. In particular, the average credit spread is calculated
using senior unsecured bonds issued by nonfinancial firms of credit quality ranging
from ”D” to ”triple A”. For my main analysis, I employ the GZ credit spread as a
measure of the EFP for the following reasons: First, the advantages of using this
spread over the BAA-AAA spread is that it accounts for the maturity horizon
of the microdata precisely.6 It is well known that the BAA and AAA corporate
bond indexes, together with other aggregate credit spread indexes, contain bond
4The lag length is chosen based on the Akaike information criterion.
5The unobservability of the external finance premium, as argued by DeGraeve (2008), is the
most problematic aspect for researchers. Following DeGraeve (2008), I employ various credit
spreads as proxies for the EFP.
6For the reference rate for the spread, Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) employ a synthetic
Treasury security with the same cash flow characteristics as the underlying corporate bond and,
hence, both yields have the same maturities.
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yields of different maturities and, therefore, they suffer from ”duration mismatch”
(see Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek, 2012). Second, the GZ-credit spread encompasses
a wide spectrum of firms with different credit quality, which implies that it is a
broad indicator of financial conditions. Other measures concentrate on firms with
good credit standing (e.g., BAA-AAA spread) or bad credit quality (e.g., high
yield-spread) and, hence, they reflect only one narrow market segment for corporate
borrowing. Third, according to Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012), the GZ credit
spread captures the compensation for defaults of individual firms and exposure
to corporate credit risk and, hence, it reflects the premium for external costs of
financing. The drawback of the GZ credit spread is that it is based on the universe
of firms that have access to unsecured corporate bonds. The development of the
spread is presented in figure A.1 in apppendix A.
The GZ credit spread, termed also the corporate credit spread, is a proxy for
the EFP, however, I will use all three expressions interchangeably. As a part of
the robustness exercise, I employ different measures of the EFP. I use standard
corporate credit spreads, such as the BAA-AAA spread, the BAA-10Tr spread
and a measure of external bond premium (EBP). Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012)
estimate the EBP from their data on individual bond yields and firm characteristics.
This measure reflects changes in the pricing of default risk and it is a component
of the GZ credit spread.
2.2.2 Identification strategy
Table 2.1 summarizes a minimal set of sign restrictions used to identify structural
shocks.7 The sign restrictions are based on the dynamic consequences of shocks in
financial New Keynesian (NK) models. The advantage of using a parsimonious
SVAR model is that identification restrictions are consistent with predictions from
a wide range of financial DSGE models.
The sign restrictions used to identify aggregate supply and monetary policy
shocks follow common practice (c.f., Canova and Nicolo´, 2002; Peersman and
Straub, 2006). As standard NK models, financial NK models show a consensus
regarding macroeconomic shocks: i) Aggregate supply shocks move output in one
direction and inflation and the nominal interest rate in the opposite direction. ii)
An unexpected increase in the nominal interest rate results in a decrease in output
and inflation. Similar to Uhlig (2005), I impose sign restrictions for two quarters to
7A widespread alternative methodology is a recursive VAR, which uses the Cholesky ordering.
However, the Choleski decomposition is not supported by the DSGE theory, as argued by
Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) and Furlanetto et al. (2014). Using DSGE models to achieve a
theory-consistent identification, I apply the SVAR methodology with sign restrictions to analyze
structural shocks.
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Table 2.1: Sign restrictions in the baseline model
Supply Monetary Financial
Real GDP - - -
GDP deflator + - NA
Nominal interest rate + + -
Credit NA NA -
EFP NA NA +
Stock prices NA NA -
Notes: A “+” indicates that the impact response is positive; a “-”
indicates that the impact response is negative; “NA” indicates
that the impact impulse response can be positive, negative or
zero and, therefore, no sign is assigned. All the shocks represent
adverse disturbances.
identify monetary policy shocks.8 In the case of the other shocks, the restrictions
are imposed on impact. Examples of aggregate supply shocks include technology
shocks and labor supply shocks. The sign restrictions imposed to identify financial
shocks are discussed separately.
Table 2.2: Sign restrictions on the EFP
Financial friction Supply Monetary Financial
Bernanke et al. (1999) CSV + + +
Carlstrom et al. (2014) CSV NA - +
Christensen and Dib (2008) CSV - + NA
Christiano et al. (2010) CSV −/+∗ + +
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) heterogeneity - -/0 +
DeGraeve (2008) CSV + + NA
Gerali et al. (2010) collateral constraints + - +
Gertler and Karadi (2011) moral hazard + + +
Meh and Moran (2010) moral hazard - + +
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) CSV - + +
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) collateral constraints 0 0 +
Notes: A “+” indicates that a rise in the EFP on impact, i.e., it is countercyclical; a “-” indicates a fall in
the EFP on impact, i.e., it is procyclical; a “0” indicates a zero-response of the EFP on impact; “NA” indi-
cates that the model does not consider a specific shock. ∗Christiano et al. (2010) report that the premium
increases in the model without the Fisher effect. If the EFP is not present in a particular model as such,
I use the difference between the return on loan and the policy rate as a measure of external financing costs.
The financial sector of the economy is left largely unrestricted in the presence
of macroeconomic shocks as the SVAR framework is based on a minimal set of sign
restrictions. Table 2.2 gives an overview of the initial reactions of the key variable
of interest, the EFP, in the selected financial frictions models (see table A.1 and
A.2 in appendix A for the remaining two financial variables). Whereas financial
8Uhlig (2005) focuses only on the monetary policy shock, which is identified by imposing sign
restrictions on the GDP price deflator, the commodity price index, nonborrowed reserves and the
federal funds rate for five months.
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DSGE models have different implications for the EFP conditional on supply and
monetary policy shocks, adverse financial shocks are usually associated with a rise
in the premium. Note that a criterion for including a financial DSGE model is that
the model analyzed the implications of at least two of the three macroeconomic
shocks - supply shocks, demand shocks9 and monetary policy shocks.
My approach of finding a common denominator among NK models with financial
frictions differs from the method employed by Canova and Paustian (2011) and
Peersman and Straub (2009), who discriminate among models with and without
nominal frictions. The structural analysis, employed in this chapter, relies on
financial NK models in the identification and aims at identifying financial frictions
that are in line with the estimated behavior of the premium.
An illustration: Different transmission mechanisms and the EFP
As indicated by table 2.1, there is little consensus among financial DSGE models
on how the premium behaves in response to macroeconomic shocks. The dynamic
reaction of the EFP10 to shocks depends on how capital accumulation and financial
frictions are specified, as has been discussed by Furlanetto et al. (2014). In the
following, I will illustrate this along one commonly used financial friction, costly
state verification. In their seminal paper, Bernanke et al. (1999) (henceforth,
BGG) are the first to introduce costly state verification to analyze the financial
accelerator mechanism, i.e., the amplification of shocks due to the existence of
financial frictions. The authors find a countercyclical premium conditional on the
realization of technology, monetary and net worth shocks. The main intuition
for the countercyclical behavior of the premium is the following: The premium
develops endogenously and is related to financial positions of firms. If balance
sheet conditions of firms are good and their leverage is low, e.g., following positive
shocks (causing an increase in real activity), the premium is low (and, hence,
countercyclical). When the BGG model is enriched by investment adjustment
costs in the capital accumulation process, DeGraeve (2008) finds a procyclical
EFP following demand shocks. His demand shock in form of a preference shock
has a countercyclical effect on credit and the price of capital, which leads to a
procyclical development of leverage and the EFP. A further extension of the BGG
framework concerns a debt-deflation channel, whereby Christensen and Dib (2008)
specify the loan contract in nominal terms. The introduction of the nominal debt
contract results in a procyclical EFP in face of aggregate supply shocks. The
9Demand shocks are included in the extended model as a part of the robustness analysis. The
baseline model identification represents a broad consensus in financial DSGE models on structural
shocks, whereas the extended model is constrained to the subset of financial frictions models that
specify demand shocks as preference shocks (as discussed in section 2.3.4)
10The EFP is the modeling feature of the debt contract originally described by Bernanke et al.
(1999). If the EFP is not present in a particular model as such, I use the difference between the
return on loan and the policy rate as a measure of external financing costs.
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propagation mechanism is the following: A positive comovement between the
EFP and output conditional on technology shocks arises because inflation reacts
countercyclically, which affects the real cost of repaying the debt procyclically
and, hence, generates a procyclical EFP. As a result of the indexation of the loan
contract to the aggregate return, stipulated as in Carlstrom et al. (2014), the EFP
is procyclical in response to monetary policy shocks. Hence, it is useful to provide
empirical evidence on the dynamics of the EFP and, subsequently, assess to which
extent theoretical frameworks fit the data.
Structural financial shocks
The central part of my identification in table 2.1 refers to the financial shock, i.e.,
the shock to the EFP. An overview of prominent modeling choices of financial
frictions and financial shocks is given in table 2.3. Note that the work by Brzoza-
Brzezina et al. (2013) compares two main mechanisms used to model financial
frictions, in particular, costly state verification in a debt contract a` la Bernanke
et al. (1999) and collateral constraints. Despite different modeling assumptions
and transmission mechanisms, dynamic consequences of financial shocks from a
set of DSGE models with financial frictions imply almost uniformly the same sign
restrictions on financial variables: An adverse financial shock results in an increase
in the EFP, a decline in credit and a decline in stock prices.
Table 2.3: Sign restrictions on EFP, credit and stock prices upon adverse financial shocks
Shock Financial friction EFP Credit q
Bernanke et al. (1999) wealth CSV + - -
Carlstrom et al. (2014) net worth CSV + - -
Christiano et al. (2010) bank funding CSV + - -
Christiano et al. (2010) liquidity buffer CSV 0 - -
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) bank technology heterogeneity + - NA
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) bad loans heterogeneity + - NA
Gerali et al. (2010) bank capital collateral constraint + - -
Gertler and Karadi (2011) net worth moral hazard + - -
Gertler and Karadi (2011) capital quality moral hazard + - -
Meh and Moran (2010) bank funding moral hazard + - -
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) net worth CSV + + -
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) LTV collateral constraint 0 - -
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) spread collateral constraint + - -
Notes: The second column describes a type of financial shock. The third column states a financial friction arising
in the model. q stands for stock prices, CSV for costly state verification and LTV for the loan-to-value ratio. A
“+” indicates that the impact response is positive; a “-” indicates that the impact response is negative; a “0” indi-
cates a zero-response of the variable on impact; “NA” indicates that the model does not include a specific variable.
Whereas most financial DSGE models generate unanimous dynamics of financial
variables (credit, EFP, stock prices) in response to financial shocks, the models
differ in their implications regarding the dynamics of inflation and nominal interest
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rates, as specified by table 2.4. Theoretical models embody both deflationary and
inflationary nature of financial shocks. By not including inflation in my identification,
I allow the data to speak for themselves as argued by Uhlig (2005). By avoiding
an a priori viewpoint on the financial disturbance as a demand-like disturbance,11
my analysis remains agnostic about the impact response of inflation. For a similar
reason, Hristov et al. (2012) and Fornari and Stracca (2013) take no stand on
inflation. Furthermore, in order to sufficiently differentiate financial shocks from
monetary shocks and aggregate supply shocks, monetary easing by the central bank
following the former shocks is specified by assumption.
Table 2.4: Sign restrictions on output, inflation and nominal interest rates upon
adverse financial shocks
Shock Financial friction Y pi R
Carlstrom et al. (2014) net worth CSV - - -
Christiano et al. (2010) bank funding CSV - + +
Christiano et al. (2010) liquidity buffer CSV - - -
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) bad loans heterogeneity - - -
Gerali et al. (2010) bank capital collateral constraint - + +
Gertler and Karadi (2011) net worth moral hazard - - -
Gertler and Karadi (2011) capital quality moral hazard - - -
Meh and Moran (2010) bank funding moral hazard - + +
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) net worth CSV 0 + +
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) LTV collateral constraint - - -
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) spread collateral constraint - + -
Notes: Y stands for real output, pi for the inflation rate, R for the nominal interest rate. A “+”
indicates that the impact response is positive; a “-” indicates that the impact response is negative; a
“0” indicates a zero-response of the variable on impact.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Dynamics of the EFP
Figure 2.1 depicts the impulse responses of the external finance premium to the
supply shock, the monetary shock and the financial shock using the identification
scheme in table 2.1. The median estimated response12 of the premium is counter-
cyclical following all three shocks,13 i.e., the premium rises initially and real GDP
falls. The conditional countercyclical movement of the EFP is consistent with the
11See Gambetti and Musso (2017) and Furlanetto et al. (2014) for the analysis of financial
shocks as demand-side disturbances.
12Since the SVAR with sign restrictions generates wide credible sets in most applications,
estimates are statistically insignificant (see, e.g., Canova and Paustian, 2011). Hence, impulse
response functions will be interpreted with the help of median estimates.
13The short term behavior of median estimated responses of the premium is compared with
their theoretical counterparts in table 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: External finance premium
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Notes: The bold lines denote the median of the impulse re-
sponses, which are estimated from a Bayesian VAR with 1000
draws. The bounds are the 16th and 84th percentiles. The
impulse responses are related to an adverse one standard devia-
tion shock. The vertical axis is expressed in percentage points.
The horizontal axis is in quarters. The time period is 1973Q1-
2010Q3.
predictions from various theoretical models (DeGraeve, 2008; Christiano et al., 2010;
Gerali et al., 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011, to name a few models summarized in
table 2.2). In other words, the countercyclical behavior of the premium arises in
theoretical frameworks including various types of financial frictions (CSV, moral
hazard, collateral constraints).
My empirical evidence does not favor the presence of the Fisher effect, i.e., a
debt deflation channel (e.g., an optimal debt contract in nominal terms as stipulated
by Christensen and Dib, 2008). Neither is the modeling of heterogeneous financial
needs (e.g., Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2010) favored by the data. These theoretical
models predict a procyclical movement of the EFP conditional on the realization of
the supply (technology) shock. However, the estimated impulses responses cannot
help to identify a dominant financial friction. Put differently, using the common
information regarding three shocks from financial NK models, I find that a subset
of financial frictions are consistent with my conditional empirical evidence - an
increase in the premium on impact following adverse supply and monetary policy
shocks.
My findings are in line with Furlanetto et al. (2014) with respect to the supply
shock and differ with respect to the monetary policy shock. The key difference is
the identification of the financial shock: While they consider financial disturbances
to have deflationary nature, I let the data speak. Furthermore, Furlanetto et al.
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(2014) also identify structural demand and investment shocks (using restrictions on
the ratio of investment and output, as well as stock prices), whereas my baseline
framework models monetary policy shocks explicitly as a type of demand distur-
bances. Hence, including the demand shock in the extended model helps to provide
a sharper identification and, possibly, to deliver a clearer picture of the conditional
dynamics of the EFP. In the robustness analysis, I account for possible differences
between structural demand shocks and financial (monetary) shocks. I find that the
main results regarding the cyclicality of the EFP over the short-term continues to
hold.
2.3.2 Impulse response analysis
While the focus of this chapter is the dynamics of the EFP, it is interesting to
discuss to which extent the model’s predictions for other variables are consistent
with theoretical predictions. The following figures show the impulse responses of
the endogenous variables to the identified structural shocks, specified as in table
2.1. In particular, I will comment on the estimated impulse response functions
of remaining unrestricted variables in relation to their theoretical counterparts,
summarized in tables in appendix A. As already explained, most SVARs with
sign restrictions generate wide credible sets and, therefore, the following impulse
response functions will be interpreted with the help of median estimates.
Conditional on an adverse supply shock, depicted in figure 2.2, the EFP
(measured by the GZ credit spread) increases. Real GDP and prices (together with
the interest rate) move into opposite directions. Stock prices and credit fall and
recover only slowly, which is in line with the implications from most of financial
DSGE models considered in table A.1 and A.2 in appendix A.
Now I will turn to the analysis of an unexpected increase in the interest rate.
The adverse one standard-deviation monetary policy shock causes a decrease in
real GDP and the GDP deflator by identifying assumption. Restrictive monetary
policy is effective only in the first two periods. The interest rate rises by 10 basis
points initially and falls by the same amount in the following periods. This result
is comparable with the median impulse response of the nominal interest rate in
the analysis by Uhlig (2005), whose sign restriction on the nominal rate has a
comparable duration. Contrary to Uhlig (2005), my model reports an unambiguous
decline in real GDP as a result of the imposed sign restriction, which is derived
from NK models.
It is worth noting that the structural model generates an increase in stock
prices and the credit volume, which stands in contrast to the predictions from
theoretical models outlined in table A.1 and A.2 in appendix A. Gal´ı and Gambetti
(2015) report a similar result on stock prices in the context of a time-varying
VAR and, therefore, argue that their result provides empirical evidence against the
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Figure 2.2: Adverse aggregate supply shock
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Notes: The bold lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are estimated from a Bayesian VAR
with 1000 draws. The bounds are the 16th and 84th percentiles. The impulse responses are related to an adverse
one standard deviation aggregate supply shock. GDP, GDP deflator, credit and stock prices are expressed
in percentage deviations, whereas the EFP and nominal interest rate are reported in percentage points. The
horizontal axis is in quarters. The time period is 1973Q1-2010Q3.
conventional wisdom that contractionary monetary policy shocks have a negative
effect on asset prices. Additionally, the positive development of the credit volume
appears to be a result of a slow readjustment of the market. It takes time for the
new credit terms to be effective in financial contracts.
The GZ credit spread increases much more than the initial rise in the interest
rate. This can reflect the degree of financial frictions in the corporate sector that
intensifies the propagation of the shock. The countercyclical movement of the EFP,
as already argued, is the feature of numerous financial DSGE models.
The financial shock is depicted in figure 2.4. My results indicate that an
unexpected rise in the EFP (by 20 basis points) leads to a prolonged contraction of
output and a significant easing of the monetary policy (by 50 basis points). These
results are in line with the results established in the literature: Financial shocks have
a persistent impact on the real economy (see Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek, 2012; Meeks,
2012). Median estimates on prices speak clearly in favor of the deflationary nature
of financial shocks (see, e.g., Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek, 2012; Furlanetto et al., 2014).
The magnitude of the increase in the EFP should not be surprising given that the
measure of the premium is based on the broad coverage of firms with different credit
standings. For a comparison, Meeks (2012) reports that his estimated one standard-
deviation credit spread shock generates initially a 50-basis-point increase in the
high yield spread, which is a difference between the speculative-grade corporate
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Figure 2.3: Adverse monetary policy shock
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Notes: The bold lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are estimated from a Bayesian VAR
with 1000 draws. The bounds are the 16th and 84th percentiles. The impulse responses are related to an
adverse one standard deviation monetary policy shock using identification scheme in table 2.1. GDP, GDP
deflator, credit and stock prices are expressed in percentage deviations, whereas the EFP and nominal in-
terest rate are reported in percentage points. The horizontal axis is in quarters. The time period is 1973Q1-2010Q3.
Figure 2.4: Adverse financial shock
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Notes: The bold lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are estimated from a Bayesian VAR
with 1000 draws. The bounds are the 16th and 84th percentiles. The impulse responses are related to an adverse
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bond yield and the closely matched government bond yield. Unlike my measure for
the premium, the high yield spread measure is related to firms subject to the high
risk of default.
2.3.3 Implications for modeling financial frictions
Many theoretical frameworks with a rich modeling of the financial sector have
uncovered different transmission channels of disruptions in financial markets. The
diversity in the modeling of the financial sector addressed many different questions
related to the financial crisis, however, the most important one remains open:
Which modeling framework is supported by the data? What can we learn about
financial frictions from the structural analysis?
This work identified financial shocks and macroeconomic shocks using the com-
mon information across different theoretical frameworks, which can be interpreted
as the smallest common denominator in the modeling of financial frictions. The
prime focus is placed on the conditional dynamics of the EFP, as most DSGE
models differ with respect to the dynamics of the EFP. The identification of relevant
financial frictions models is undertaken by comparing the empirical evidence on the
credit spread in the short term (up to one year) with the theoretical predictions
regarding the EFP. Credit and the price of capital decline almost uniformly in
response to adverse macroeconomic shocks across the models, and therefore it is
difficult to differentiate models along these lines.14 As I concentrate on the median
estimates (most of which are not statistically significant), the caveat applies that
the identification of an empirically relevant financial friction should be interpreted
with some care.
The structural analysis indicates that the premium is countercyclical following
monetary policy shocks and supply shocks. The countercyclical nature of the EFP
is consistent with various DSGE models with financial frictions, e.g., Bernanke
et al. (1999); Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gerali et al. (2010). On the other hand,
transmission mechanisms associated with financial DSGE models, which generate
a procyclical EFP, are not consistent with my empirical estimates. For example,
nominal debt contracts of Christensen and Dib (2008) and heterogeneous needs
of borrowers and savers, as modeled by Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010), incorporate
transmission mechanisms that are not supported by my empirical results on the
EFP.
The nutshell intuition for the countercyclical EFP in the aforementioned models
is the following: A negative comovement between the EFP and output conditional
on technology (supply) shocks arises because inflation reacts countercyclically,
14Recall that the empirical impulse response functions of these two variables coincide to a larger
extent with their theoretical counterparts. The exception is the reaction of the credit volume in
the case of the monetary shock.
2.3. RESULTS 19
which leads to a countercyclical development of leverage and the EFP. The unex-
pected monetary tightening decreases aggregate demand, which together with the
decline in the price of capital and the higher value of debt, results in an increase
in the EFP (making it countercyclical). Through widening of the premium, the
propagation of shocks gets accelerated in models with financial frictions.
There are many theoretical model candidates that explain responses observed
in the data. The nature of financial frictions can take different forms: Moral hazard
problems arise as a result of misbehavior of bankers along the lines of Gertler and
Karadi (2011). Costly verification is undertaken by financial intermediaries due
to the asymmetric information problem between borrowers and lenders, as in the
setups by Bernanke et al. (1999); DeGraeve (2008). Collateral constraints combined
with monopolistic competition between different bank branches are analyzed by
Gerali et al. (2010) among others.
2.3.4 Robustness of the results
Extended model
The baseline model represents a parsimonious framework that identifies structural
shocks using restrictions that are derived from a wide range of financial DSGE
models. The problematic aspect of identifying too few shocks is that non-identified
shocks, arise somewhere else in the SVAR. In particular, financial shocks could
also embody demand shocks, that are not identified. Determining a combination of
robust sign restrictions to identify demand shocks is a controversial task. Demand
shocks can be preference shocks, government spending shocks or investment shocks.
Depending on the type of demand shocks, DSGE models generate different predic-
tions. Moreover, additional identifying restrictions need to be mutually exclusive.
In my proposed identification scheme of the extended model, presented in table
2.5, the structural demand shock corresponds to a preference shock in financial
DSGE models. Typically, a negative preference shock induces households shift
consumption towards the future. As savings increase and investment rises, the price
for capital increases, which reduces the EFP (see, e.g., DeGraeve, 2008, among
others).15 As a result, the extended model is more restrictive than the baseline
model.
By disentangling demand and financial shocks in the extended model, I try to
obtain a sharp identification of financial shocks. Results from the extended model
are included in appendix A (see figures A.2, A.3, A.4 and A.5). Main findings re-
garding the cyclicality of the EFP do not change in the extended model, confirming
15The overview of demand shocks in appendix A shows that there is a less clear consensus which
restriction to impose on financial variables (c.f., credit and the price of capital) to identify demand
shocks. Given that most of considered frameworks, which model preference shocks, generate a
decline in the EFP following adverse demand shocks, I proceed with a restriction on the EFP.
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Table 2.5: Sign restrictions in the extended model
Supply Demand Monetary Financial
Real GDP - - - -
GDP deflator + - - NA
Nominal interest rate + - + -
Credit NA NA NA -
EFP NA - NA +
Stock prices NA NA NA -
Notes: A “+” indicates that the impact response is positive; a “-” indicates
that the impact response is negative; “NA” indicates that the impact impulse
response can be positive, negative or zero and, therefore, no sign is assigned. All
the shocks represent adverse disturbances.
the countercyclical development of the EFP over the short term following supply
and monetary policy shocks. The dynamics of most variables are the same as in the
baseline model. However, two different results will be elaborated in the following.
Reaction of stock prices to monetary policy shocks: The transmission of the
monetary policy shocks seems to change in the extended model. Stock prices react
negatively to the contractionary monetary policy shock (see figure A.4), which is
consistent with the conventional wisdom. These results suggest that if I do not
clearly differentiate between monetary policy shocks and structural demand shocks,
as in the baseline model, monetary policy shocks embed also other demand shocks
which might drive the reaction of stock prices in the opposite direction. This result
is interesting, especially in the light of the recent debate by Gal´ı and Gambetti
(2015). A further explanation is presented by Canova and Paustian (2011), who
argue that properties of the monetary policy shock can be mismeasured if too few
sign restrictions are imposed.
Reaction of the GDP deflator to financial shocks: Median estimates on the GDP
deflator speak for the possibility of the inflationary nature of financial shocks (see
figures A.5). Note that the baseline model indicates that financial shocks have
typically deflationary nature, whereas the extended model, which takes seriously
differences between demand and financial shocks, implies the opposite. To my knowl-
edge, most of the literature did not address the role of price dynamics following
financial shocks; or, if anything, the empirical research emphasized the disinflation-
ary effect of financial shocks (see Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek, 2012; Furlanetto et al.,
2014). The recent theoretical framework by Gilchrist et al. (2014) addressed the
possibility of increased prices in face of negative financial shocks. The rationale for
the increase in inflation, argued by the authors, is the following: Their NK model
allows that firms’ pricing setting decision affect firms’ market shares. Using two
types of firms (financially strong and weak firms), they show that firms with a
limited access to finance and, therefore, in weak financial positions, do not proceed
with investment opportunities and increase prices to keep their market shares.
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Alternative measures of the EFP
My structural analysis is based on a specific proxy for the EFP, the GZ credit
spread. To counter a possible critique related to the choice of the proxy, I employ
further spread indicators used to measure the EFP: BAA-AAA spread, BAA-10Tr
spread and the EBP, described in section 2.2.1. Figure 2.5 plots median impulse
responses of these spreads using the model specification in table 2.1.
Figure 2.5: Impulse responses of alternative measures of the EFP
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Notes: Lines denote the median impulse responses. The estimated model is based on identification
in table 2.1. The impulse responses are related to an adverse one standard deviation shock. The
vertical axis is expressed in percentage points. The horizontal axis is in quarters. The time period is
1973Q1-2010Q3.
The reactions of credit spreads to shocks are comparable to the baseline measure
of the EFP: Proxies of the premium react countercyclically to supply shocks and
monetary policy shocks over the short term. There is some heterogeneity across the
estimated responses, which can be explained by a different class of firms considered
by alternative measures: First, the BAA-AAA spread and the BAA-10Tr spread
are related to firms with high credit standing. Especially, the result regarding the
former spread suggests that the restrictive monetary policy depresses the premium
of corporate firms with low default risks. This result suggests that the transmission
mechanism of the monetary policy shock can vary with the degree of financial
frictions in the corporate sectors. As already argued, the GZ credit spread reflects
the premium that non-financial firms pay for their unsecured corporate debt, taking
into account all different rating categories and, therefore, being more representative
for the whole economy. Second, the standard corporate credit spreads do not use a
reference rate with the same maturity profile as corporate bond yields, implying
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that potential effects from maturity profile of reference yields can matter. This
problematic aspect of standard spreads is solved by construction of the GZ credit
spread.
Robustness check: Excluding the Great Recession and the pre-Volcker
era
To analyze whether the results are driven by the financial crisis of 2007-2009, I
consider the dataset excluding the observations from 2007Q4 onwards (according
to the NBER dating of the recession). Furthermore, the conduct of monetary policy
has significantly changed with the Fed presidency of Paul Volcker. In this context,
much of the empirical research on monetary policy shocks has incorporated a shift
in the monetary policy stance as of 1979Q3. Therefore, I exclude also a part of the
data sample related to the pre-Volcker era.
The analysis confirms the main results on an economic downturn following
adverse financial shocks, however, the credible sets are wider (see figure A.7 in
appendix A). Main estimates concerning aggregate shocks and the behavior of the
premium remain the same. These results confirm the previously found cyclicality
of the EFP (see figure A.6 and A.7 in appendix A). As expected, the estimated
rise in the EFP upon the adverse financial shock is subdued in comparison to the
result based on the whole sample.
Residual check: Do adverse financial shocks measure productivity
losses?
Financing booms in the US are positively associated with productivity changes
(see Jermann and Quadrini, 2007). To analyze whether financial shocks are indeed
measuring financial disturbances as opposed to productivity changes, I examine a
relationship between financial shocks and the change in total factor productivity
(TFP).16 First, the correlation between the SVAR-estimated financial shock and
the total factor productivity is 0.09 and statistically insignificant (p-value of 55%).
Second, I regress normalized TFP on its lag and the contemporaneous estimates of
structural shocks (aggregate supply, monetary policy and credit spread shocks).
The estimated equation is an OLS regression in the spirit of Gal´ı and Rabanal
(2004) and reads:
TFPt = −0.03TFPt−1 − 0.19εASt − 0.06εMPt + 0.04εFSt .
(0.64) (0.01) (0.41) (0.55)
Note: The p-values are reported in the brackets.
16I use the measure of total factor productivity adjusted for utilisation provided by Basu et al.
(2006). The data series in quarters is reported by Fernald (2012).
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My estimates show that the aggregate supply shock is relevant for the fluctua-
tions in TFP (as its coefficient is significant). None of the other estimated shocks
are relevant for the changes in TFP. In particular, the financial shock appears not
to be a cause of the productivity fluctuations.
2.4 Conclusion
Despite extensive research on financial markets and financial frictions, there is no
workhorse model with financial frictions that is fully supported by data. This paper
represents one possible approach to identify relevant financial frictions.
The main focus of the paper is to analyze the dynamics of the EFP in response
to macroeconomic shocks when shocks are identified in a theory-consistent manner.
Using common information from various financial DSGE models, the minimal set
of sign restrictions is employed to disentangle financial shocks from macroeconomic
shocks. The SVAR model is used to gauge financial frictions that are in line with
the data.
The structural empirical analysis shows that the EFP is countercyclical following
supply and monetary policy shocks. This is good news for major financial frictions
models such as Bernanke et al. (1999); Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gerali et al.
(2010), as these models generate the cyclicality of the premium observed in the data.
Furthermore, it is indicated that different types of financial frictions can generate
transmission mechanisms that are consistent with the conditional dynamics of the
EFP.
My identification of structural shocks is based on a common denominator from
financial DSGE models. There are some possible avenues for future research. First,
by considering a smaller set of financial DSGE models, it would be possible to
identify certain types of financial shocks, e.g., shocks arising in credit market or
shocks associated with banks’ capital. Second, given my weak evidence on the
inflationary nature of financial shocks, it would be useful to better understand
the dynamics of inflation following financial shocks. For example, the analysis
by Peersman and Wagner (2014) provides some evidence in this respect, as they
differentiate among bank lending shocks, securitizaton shocks and risk taking shocks,
and show that the latter shocks have inflationary tendency. Third, estimating large
SVAR models with a more elaborate representation of the financial sector and more
financial shocks can possibly help to identify a workhorse financial frictions model.
Chapter 3
Corporate debt composition and
business cycles
Abstract
Based on empirical evidence, I propose a DSGE model with two
financial sectors to analyze the role of the corporate debt composition
(bank versus bond financing) in the transmission of economic shocks.
It is shown that in the presence of monetary and financial shocks,
cyclical changes in the corporate debt composition significantly
attenuate the effects on investment and output. An additional result
of the theoretical model is that a bank-dependent economy is more
affected by financial shocks, which is in line with recent empirical
results by Gambetti and Musso (2017), who report stronger real
effects of loan supply shocks in Europe (with an excessive reliance on
bank debt) than in the US.
Keywords: Debt financing, bank loans, corporate bonds, fi-
nancial frictions.
JEL Classification: E32, E44, C68.
3.1 Introduction
How do changes in the corporate debt composition (bank debt versus capital market
debt) affect the propagation of macroeconomic and financial shocks? It is well
documented that the corporate debt composition varies over the business cycle (see,
e.g., Adrian et al., 2012; Becker and Ivashina, 2014). The variation in the external
financing mix seems to matter quantitatively for the dynamic consequences of the
monetary policy shock (see empirical evidence by Kashyap et al., 1996; Oliner and
Rudebusch, 1996). Therefore, it is natural to ask what role cyclical variations in
corporate debt play in the transmission of economic shocks.
To address this question, I first provide additional empirical evidence on the
dynamics of real output, investment and corporate debt composition based on an
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SVAR with sign restrictions.1 I show that the conditional dynamics of the debt
composition depend on the type of economic shock. In particular, when the debt
composition reacts more strongly to the shock, the response of investment is less
persistent. Second, I develop a financial DSGE model featuring bond and loan
financing in order to analyze the role of debt composition in the propagation of
macroeconomic and financial shocks. I show that an increase in capital market
debt in reaction to monetary and financial shocks attenuates the response of invest-
ment and real activity. When bank credit is the only source of external financing
(bank-dependent economy), financial shocks have stronger contractionary effects
on the real economy than in an economy with bank and capital market debt. This
result is in line with the empirical findings by Gambetti and Musso (2016), who
report stronger real short-term effects of loan supply shocks in Europe than in the
US. Note that the ratio of bank to non-bank debt is almost eight times higher in
Europe than in the US (see DeFiore and Uhlig, 2011).
In the theoretical model, banks supply loans to small firms and mutual funds
make bond financing available to large firms, which is meant to capture the em-
pirical finding by Colla et al. (2013) on the debt specialization of large and small
US firms. Banks face a leverage constraint, modeled as in Gertler and Karadi
(2011), which determines the amount of loans granted to firms. A tightening of
banks’ capital constraints causes a decrease in banks’ supply of loans, which ad-
versely affects the financing and investment decisions of small firms. Therefore,
the changes in the conditions related to the external financing of small firms are
effective through a bank lending channel. The funding problem of large firms is
modeled via optimal debt contracts with mutual funds as in Bernanke et al. (1999),
whereby mutual funds are not exposed to any capital requirement. The capital
market channel emphasizes the ability of unconstrained mutual funds to underwrite
bond contacts of leveraged large firms in return for an increased finance premium.
Additionally, the degree of the asymmetric information problem between large firms
and mutual funds is not severe, i.e., mutual funds can recoup the assets of firms
without incurring large costs, which is line with the notion that dispersed mutual
funds do not exercise high monitoring effort (see Gorton and Winton, 2003).
I consider two financial shocks hitting the financial sector of my model. The
first one is a banking shock which causes a confidence loss in this sector leading to
tighter leverage constraints and an increase in bank finance premia. The second one
is an economy-wide financial shock that affects both sectors causing an increase in
the distrust of banks and an inefficiency in the auditing of large firms by mutual
funds. The latter shock is calibrated to match the empirical evidence on bank and
non-bank premia following the estimated financial shock.
1The sign restrictions are imposed to identify supply, demand and financial shocks. Imposed
sign restrictions are compatible with predictions from a wide range of financial DSGE models.
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The nutshell intuition for the relevance of the debt composition in the prop-
agation of shocks is the following: Contractionary shocks (resulting in a rise in
finance premia on bank loans) impair the ability of leveraged banks to provide loans
(leading to credit tightening) which adversely affects bank-financing dependent firms
(c.f., Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Bond-financing dependent firms can nevertheless
issue bonds in times of rising bond finance premia. Note that a stronger increase in
bank finance premia relative to bond finance premia leads to a relative decrease
in loan-to-bond financing and investments of the respective firm sector. Financial
shocks trigger stronger movements in finance premia and lending volumes, which
in turn results in substantial negative effects on the real economy.
This paper is not alone in analyzing the role of corporate debt composition
in the real economy. DeFiore and Uhlig (2015) also show that a shift from bank
to bond financing mitigates the negative effects of financial shocks on the real
economy. However, there are some important differences regarding empirical facts
and model features between my and their work. Using the US data, I estimate
financial shocks in a SVAR framework and show that bank debt is relatively more
expensive than capital market debt. DeFiore and Uhlig (2015) document that the
cost of capital market financing increased more than the cost of bank financing
in Europe during the financial crisis of 2008-09. In my DSGE model I allow for
leveraged banks to restrict credit supply in times of tight lending standards, whereas
DeFiore and Uhlig (2015) do not explicitly model the role of banks. Therefore, my
theoretical setup considers the extent to which a bank-lending channel has effects
on investment. Furthermore, I try to understand the role of the debt composition
in the transmission of standard business cycle shocks, whereas DeFiore and Uhlig
(2015) focus only on financial shocks. However, my SVAR evidence, together with
the evidence from Kashyap et al. (1996) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), shows
that the change in the external financing mix is not only associated with financial
shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized along the following lines. Section 2
presents the empirical evidence. Section 3 describes the model setup. Section 4
discusses the main results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical evidence on the corporate debt
composition
I first present some evidence on the dynamics of macroeconomic and financial
variables. More precisely, I use an SVAR with sign restrictions to identify supply,
demand and financial shocks. The former two are standard drivers of business
cycles, whereas financial shocks have been only lately considered as an important
source of macroeconomic fluctuations (see, for example, Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek,
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2012). The imposed sign restrictions comply with the predictions from a large class
of New Keynesian models with financial frictions.2 The dynamic consequences
of economic shocks motivate the theoretical model with the corporate debt
composition developed in section 3.3.
Figure 3.1: SVAR evidence
Note: The lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are estimated from a Bayesian
VAR with 1000 draws. The impulse responses are related to an adverse one-standard deviation
shock. The horizontal axis is in quarters. Time period: 1980:Q1 to 2014:Q2.
Figure 3.1 displays median impulse responses of real GDP, real investment
spending, the GDP deflator, the federal funds (FF) rate, credit, the bank loans
share (loan-to-bond ratio), the CP-spread (commercial paper rate - FF rate) and the
BP-spread (bank prime rate - FF rate) based on the estimated model from 1980:Q1
to 2014:Q2. All variables are for the US and specified in logs, except for the spreads
and the FF rate, which are expressed in percentage points. The empirical exercise
aims at providing additional evidence on real variables and financial indicators of
interest - the corporate debt composition, measured as the relative share of bank
loans to corporate bonds, the cost of bank and non-bank debt, measured by the
2See table 2.4in appendix B. The discussion of the extended model specification is elaborated
in the second chapter. Given the limited importance of monetary policy shocks for business cycle
fluctuations, I excluded these shocks from the empirical analysis. For the dynamic effects of
monetary policy shocks on the corporate debt composition, see (Kashyap et al., 1996; Oliner and
Rudebusch, 1996).
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BP- and CP-spread, respectively,3 for the theoretical analysis conducted in section
4.3. It should be noted that not every impulse response is statistically significant;
however, it gives the general tendency of the variable. The respective credible sets
are computed and reported in appendix B.
The estimated financial shock represents an exogenous disturbance to the BP-
spread that leads to an increase in both credit spreads and a decline in credit
volume. Similar to the findings by Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012), I show that
investment and real output fall significantly in response to the adverse financial
shock (see figure B.2 in appendix B); however, they recover after ten quarters. The
ratio of bank loans to bonds declines significantly, whereas the bank premium, i.e.,
the BP-spread, increases almost three times more than the non-bank premium,
the CP-spread. In contrast to DeFiore and Uhlig (2015), I document a relatively
stronger increase in the bank spread than in the spread related to capital market
finance conditional on the identified financial shock. The most striking feature
in figure 3.1 is a strong cyclical variation in investment and the corporate debt
composition. Both variables deviate substantially from their mean values, tend to
overshoot over the medium term, and then revert to their means.
Negative supply shocks cause a persistent decline in investment and output.
After initial declines in both spreads, bank spreads rise more than spreads for
capital market finance. The estimated shock appears to cause an increase in the
loan-to-bond ratio. For completeness, demand shocks lead to declines in investment,
output, the bank-to-bond ratio and credit spreads.
To summarize, the cyclical variation of the corporate debt composition differs
depending on the type of shock. Bank spreads increase more in reaction to financial
shocks and aggregate supply shocks than non-bank spreads. The identified financial
shock produces a strong reaction of the debt composition and a rather short-lived
effect on investment. In the following, the model is developed to match this empirical
evidence.
3.3 The model
I introduce two types of external financing - bank and non-bank debt - associated
with small and large corporate finance firms,4 respectively, into a medium-scale
3Two spreads are used to capture the costs of short-term bank and capital market finance.
Due to the unavailability of data, I use commercial paper as a proxy for capital market finance.
4These firms are in charge of financing decisions, similar to corporate finance divisions of
firms. The differentiation between small and large corporate finance firms matches the following
empirical evidence: Cantillo and Wright (2000) show that large firms use bond financing, whereas
smaller firms rely only on bank financing. Colla et al. (2013) and Rauh and Sufi (2010) found that
the majority of US firms tend to concentrate on one type of debt. However, a certain degree in
heterogeneity in debt structure is found among the large rated firms, whereas the small unrated
firms tend to specialize in bank financing.
3.3. THE MODEL 29
Figure 3.2: Model overview
Capital
producers
Large corporate
finance firms
Mutual funds
Capital
producers
Small corporate
finance firms
Banks
Final goods
firms
Intermediate
goods firms
Households Central bank
buy
capital
corporate bonds
buy
capital
supply
labor
ren
t
cap
ital
re
nt
ca
pi
ta
l
de
po
sit
s
d
ep
os
it
s
sets
nominal rate
bank loans
investment
goods
in
ve
st
m
en
t
go
od
s
intermediate
goods
consumption goods
DSGE model. Two financial frictions, moral hazard and costly state verification,
are motivated by the empirical evidence in the second chapter. Banks are modeled
as depository institutions and “relationship-lenders”, as in the setup by Gertler
and Karadi (2011). Due to a moral hazard problem between depositors and banks,
banks can supply only as much credit to small firms as indicated by their leverage
constraint. I specify an adverse banking shock that results in a confidence loss in
the banking sector and leads to a tightening of bank credit supply. On the other
hand, capital market debt (corporate bond) issuance is considered as “unmonitored
lending”, since dispersed bond holders do not exercise direct monitoring and
evaluation of outcomes of firms’ projects.5 To capture the notion of dispersed
investors and their monitoring effort, I use a debt contract with costly state
verification as specified by Bernanke et al. (1999). I assume that the asymmetric
information problem between mutual funds and large corporate finance firms is not
severe, so that the recouping of the returns in the case of default of these firms is
not costly for mutual funds. Note that I also specify that the adverse economy-wide
financial shock affects the ability of mutual funds to verify the realized returns
from large firms (by increasing monitoring costs) in addition to causing a loss in
confidence in the banking sector.
5See the discussion on differences between bank loans and corporate bonds in Gorton and
Winton (2003).
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The model economy is populated by seven different types of agents: households,
corporate finance firms, intermediate firms, final goods firms, capital goods produc-
ers, lending banks and mutual funds. The bird’s eye view of the model economy
is given in figure 3.2. Households consume, supply labor and save via depositing
resources with financial intermediaries. Corporate finance firms obtain credit in
the form of bank loans and corporate bonds in order to finance their investments
in physical capital. The retail sector is monopolistically competitive. The retailers
or intermediate goods firms combine the physical capital from two sectors with the
labor to produce differentiated products and set prices. The final goods producers
combine all the intermediate goods and make it available to the household. The
central bank conducts the monetary policy by following a Taylor-type monetary
policy rule.
3.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of households with a unit mass. As in Gertler and Karadi
(2011), I assume that a fraction f of households are workers, whereas a fraction
1−f manage banks. Workers earn their wage income every period, whereas bankers
reinvest their profits from bank loans until they exit the banking sector. The
accumulated profits are then transferred to its family. To ensure that both fractions
of the households face the same consumption stream, perfect consumption insurance
within the household family is assumed. The household consumes, works and saves
in the form of riskless short-term government bonds (deposits), which is issued by
banks and mutual funds.6 In short, the household solves the following intertemporal
maximization problem:
max
Ct,Dt,Lt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln(Ct − hCt−1)− ψL
1 + φL
L1+φLt
)
subject to a sequence of constraints:
Ct +Dt = Rt−1Dt−1 + wtLt +Πt, for t ∈ 0, 1, 2...
where 0 < β < 1 and ψL, φL > 0, 0 < h < 1 denote, respectively, the household’s
discount factor, the weight on the disutility of labor, the inverse of the labor
supply elasticity and the degree of habit formation. Ct denotes real consumption,
wt real wage rate, Dt holdings of one-period risk-free debt, Rt risk-free gross return
between t− 1 and t, Lt hours worked, Πt profits from the ownership of financial
and non-financial firms, net the transfers that the household gives to its members
entering the financial system in t and lump-sum receipts from cost of monitoring
6Households do not make a portfolio choice, as both financial intermediaries pay the same
return, the real interest rate.
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by mutual funds.
The first order conditions with respect to Ct, Lt and Dt are given by:
λt =
1
(Ct − hCt−1) −
βh
(EtCt+1 − hCt) , (3.1)
1 = βEt {RtΛt,t+1} , (3.2)
wt =
ψL L
φL
t
λt
, (3.3)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier and Λt,t+1 ≡ λt+1λt .
3.3.2 Intermediate goods firms
There are infinitely many monopolistic firms on the interval [0, 1], which produce
differentiated intermediate goods. A representative firm i produces output Y mi,t
using labor Li,t and capital input Ki,t:
Y mi,t = AtK
α
i,tL
1−α
i,t , (3.4)
with 0 < α < 1 and At represents aggregate technology. The capital input is
a composite of two types of capital, KSi,t and K
B
i,t, provided by small and large
corporate finance firms, which are indicated by the respective superscripts S and
B, and it is given by:7
Ki,t =
[
η(KSi,t)
ρ + (1− η)(KBi,t)ρ
] 1
ρ , (3.5)
where ρ is the degree of substitutability between the two types of capital services
and η the share of small firms.
The intermediate firm rents capital and hires labor in competitive markets to
minimize its costs, taking the real wage wt and real rental rates of capital, r
S
k,t and
rBk,t, as given. Thus, the cost minimization problem reads:
min
{Li,t,KSi,t,KBi,t}
C(·) = wtLi,t +KSi,trSk,t +KBi,trBk,t
subject to ˜(3.4) and ˜(3.5).
After substituting the optimal choices back into the cost function and using
symmetry, since all firms face the same input prices, the optimality condition yields
7Note that after solving cost minimization problem of intermediate firms and assuming
symmetry, index i drops. All the individual members are identical within each group, i.e.,
KS,at = ηK
S
t and K
B,a
t = (1 − η)KBt , whereby KS,at and KB,at represent the sector-specific
bundles of capital.
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the following real marginal costs st:
st =
rjk,t
αAt
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α (
Kjt
)ρ−1 [
η (KSt )
ρ
+ (1− η) (KBt )ρ
] 1
ρ
−1
, (3.6)
which states that the real marginal cost equals the ratio of the rental rate of capital
to the marginal product of capital of firms.
The minimization problem also yields the optimality condition for the choice of
capital services and labor hours, respectively:
rk,Bt
rk,St
=
(
KBt
KSt
)ρ−1
, (3.7)
wt = st
αY mt
Lt
. (3.8)
Intermediate firms also set their prices a` la Calvo (1983) in order to maximize
the present value of the expected future nominal profits:
max Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθ)τΛt,t+τ [(
P ∗t
Pt+τ
τ∏
k=1
Πιt+k−1 − St+τ )Yi,t+τ ]
subject to Y mi,t+τ =
(
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
)−
Yt+τ .
where St represents firm’s nominal marginal costs. Parameters  > 0, 0 < θ < 1
denote, respectively, the price elasticity of demand and the degree of price stickiness.
The firms which cannot change prices in a given period adjust them according to
the indexation rule:
Pi,t = Pi,t−1Πιt−1,
where Πt−1 = Pt−1/Pt−2 is the gross inflation rate in t − 1 and the parameter
0 ≤ ι ≤ 1 controls the degree of backward-lookingness in prices.
First order condition for optimal price setting reads:
Et
∞∑
i=0
(βθ)τΛt,t+τ
{
P ∗t
Pt+τ
τ∏
k=1
Πιt+k−1 −
ε− 1
ε
St+τ
}(
P ∗t
Pt+τ
)−
Yt+τ = 0. (3.9)
The solution of the maximization problem equates the newly set price, P ∗t , to
the weighted average of all future expected marginal costs, i.e. taking into account
the possibility that the newly set price could remain active forever. Using symmetric
equilibrium and the law of large numbers, aggregate price index evolves as follows:
Pt =
{
(1− θ)P ∗t 1− + θ(Pt−1Πιt−1)1−
} 1
1− , (3.10)
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The equilibrium conditions associated with the optimal choice of price give rise
to the New Keynesian Phillips curve with price indexation in the following manner:
Π∗t =

− 1
Fmt
Zmt
Πt, (3.11)
where Fmt and Z
m
t are defined as F
m
t ≡ Y mt st + βθEtΛt,t+1Πt+1Π−ιt Fmt+1 and
Zmt ≡ Y mt +βθEtΛt,t+1Π−1t+1Π−ι(−1)t Zmt+1. Aggregate output, Yt, is related to the
aggregate intermediate output, Y mt , in the following way:
Y mt = Yt∆t, (3.12)
where ∆t measures the price dispersion, which takes the following form:
∆t = θ∆t−1ΠtΠ
−ι
t−1 + (1− θ)
−1
−1
(
1− θΠ−1t Π−θ(−1)t−1
) 
−1
. (3.13)
3.3.3 Corporate finance firms and debt financing
The financial sector is composed of a bond and a loan market, implying that there
are two types of financial intermediaries: a) banks that accept deposits and lend
to small corporate finance firms and b) mutual funds that underwrite corporate
bonds issued by large corporate finance firms and thereby channel the funds
by the households (see the graphical representation in figure 3.2). Accordingly,
the corporate finance firms, who enable the financing of firms, are divided in
two groups - large (corporate finance) firms qualify for bond financing whereas
small (corporate finance) firms turn to retail banks to obtain loan financing.8 For
convenience, I will refer to two types of corporate finance firms as large and small
firms. The modeling approach is supported by the recent findings by Colla et al.
(2013) and Rauh and Sufi (2010) who show, using different samples, that the
majority of US firms tend to concentrate on one type of debt. Note that the share
of firms in each sector is assumed to be fixed, in order to match the characteristics
of bank and bond financing in the US; however, this assumption can be relaxed. In
the current setting, the change in debt composition happens along the intensive
margin (relative share of loans to bonds) following the shocks.
8The specification of small versus large corporate finance firms is used for reasons of convenience.
It serves to differentiate two types of firms based on their financing needs. Moreover, it replicates
a general empirical finding that large corporations use, by and large, more capital market debt,
whereas small firms use bank financing.
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3.3.4 Bond financing
Large (corporate finance) firms,9 which are equivalent to entrepreneurs in Bernanke
et al. (1999), convert the raw capital into the effective capital and rent it to
intermediate firms. The capital purchase is financed partly by the firm net worth,
NBt , and partly by debt financing in the form of corporate bonds, B
B
t :
BBt ≡ QBt KBt −NBt . (3.14)
Large representative firm makes revenues by providing capital services to the
intermediate producers and selling the non-depreciated capital to capital goods
producers. Therefore, the ex-post returns on capital are given by:
RBk,t+1 =
rBk,t+1 + (1− δ)QBt+1
QBt
, (3.15)
where QBt denotes the price of capital in the respective sector. The return on
capital represents the ratio between the revenues coming from capital services
(i.e., the rental rate of capital, rBk,t+1) and proceeds from selling the undepreciated
capital and costs associated with the purchases of capital. Parameter 0 < δ < 1
denotes the depreciation rate.
Optimal bond contract
The debt contract between a large firm and a mutual fund follows a standard debt
(bond) contract10 as presented in Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2010,
2014) (henceforth, CMR). An idiosyncratic shock ωBt affects each large firm and
determines how much of the raw capital turns into effective capital. If ωBt > ω¯
B
t ,
the lender receives the full payment, ZBt+1B
B
t , where Z
B
t+1 is the agreed rate to be
paid one period later. I assume that ωBt is log normally distributed with E(ω
B
t ) = 1
and V ar(lnωBt ) = σω
2. All the distribution properties are included in the relevant
definitions and equilibrium conditions in appendix B (for more details see, e.g.,
Bernanke et al., 1999). At the center of the model is the mutual fund’s participation
9The superscript B refers to the variables associated with the representative large firm. It
will be shown that all the firms within the sector are identical, which allows me to denote the
aggregate variables related to the respective sector with the respective subscript.
10The maximization problem refers to a representative B-th large (corporate finance) firm in
the B-sector; however, to simplify the notation, I will only use a “B”-superscript to refer to the
variables related to the large/bond sector. After solving for the optimal contract, it can be shown
that the solution does not depend on any individual characteristics of the firm and that all the
firms in the respective sector are identical and symmetric.
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constraint given by:
Et
{
(1− Ft(ω¯Bt+1))ZBt+1BBt + (1− µt+1)
∫ ω¯Bt+1
0
ωBdFt(ω
B)RBk,t+1Q
B
t K
B
t
}
≥ RtBBt , (3.16)
Ft(ω¯
B
t+1) is a cumulative distribution function (and the probability of default) of ω
B.
On the LHS of equation (3.16) there are two components: the amount of corporate
bonds that is paid back by the non-defaulting large firm and, in the default case,
the acquisition of the large firm’s remaining assets after paying monitoring costs,
which is a linear function of the value of assets. The expected return from the debt
contract must be equal to the return from a riskless asset (i.e., household deposits).
The optimal contract for the representative large firm solves:
max
{ω¯Bt+1,KBt }
Et
{[
1− Γt(ω¯Bt+1)
]
RBk,t+1Q
B
t K
B
t
}
(3.17)
s.t.˜Et
{[
Γt(ω¯
B
t+1)− µt+1Gt(ω¯Bt+1)
]
RBk,t+1Q
B
t K
B
t
}
= Rt(Q
B
t K
B
t −NBt ), (3.18)
Note that the objective function represents the share 1 − Γt(·) of average large
firm earnings obtained by large firms and the constraint is the rewritten par-
ticipation constraint given in equation (3.16),11 using the following definitions:
Γt(ω¯
B
t+1) ≡ (1 − Ft(ω¯Bt+1)ω¯Bt+1 +
∫ ω¯Bt+1
0
ωdFt(ω
B) and Gt(ω¯
B
t+1) ≡
∫ ω¯Bt+1
0
ωBdFt(ω
B).
Γt(·) and µt+1Gt(·) denote respectively the share of large firm earnings received
by the mutual fund and the expected monitoring costs. I allow for monitoring
costs to be time-varying in order to model the change in the auditing ability of
mutual funds. For example, an unexpected increase in monitoring costs makes
the verification of the large firm’s project outcomes costlier, i.e., the degree of
asymmetric information between the mutual fund and the large firm worsens.
Combining the first order conditions, I obtain the relationship between the
return on capital and bond finance premium, EtR
B
k,t+1 = Et[ρ(ω¯
B
t+1)Rt], where
ρ(ω¯Bt+1) =
Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1)
[(Γt(ω¯Bt+1)−µt+1Gt(ω¯Bt+1))Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1)+(1−Γt(ω¯Bt+1))(Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1)−µt+1G′t(ω¯Bt+1))]
represents
the bond finance premium. The external finance premium represents a wedge
between the cost of financing capital and costs of funds from the lender. In the
absence of monitoring costs and the possibility of default (F (ωB) → 0), ρ → 1.
With costly state verification in place, the monitoring arises to verify the success
of firm’s projects, implying ρ > 1.
Defining the leverage ratio φB =
QBt K
B
t
NBt
and using the resource constraint, a
relationship between the threshold productivity and the leverage ratio can be
11The market for corporate bonds is perfectly competitive, which implies that mutual funds
make zero profits and the constraint holds with a strict equality. CMR state that the free entry
ensures that the constraint is a strict equality.
36 CHAPTER 3. DEBT COMPOSITION AND BUSINESS CYCLES
written as:
φBt = 1 + Et

Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1)
(Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1)−µtG′t(ω¯Bt+1))
(Γt(ω¯
B
t+1)− µt+1Gt(ω¯Bt+1))
(1− Γt(ω¯Bt+1))
 . (3.19)
Therefore, there exists a one-for-one relationship between the leverage ratio
and the external bond finance premium, φB = φ(ρ). Each large firm chooses
a combination of (ω¯B, KB) or equivalently (ω¯B, φB) to solve the maximization
problem in (3.17). Since the initial net worth position does not affect the optimality
condition, the leverage ratio is the same across firms in the bond sector and they
pay the same bond finance premium.
Within one period, the large firm sells the undepreciated capital to capital
producers, collects the proceeds from capital rented to the intermediate good
producers and settles the debt obligation with the mutual fund. A random fraction
1 − γB of net worth is transferred to the household. The net worth of firm gets
accumulated with the constant lump-sum transfers of households, WB, and the
remaining γB fraction of the share of large firm earnings:
NBt = γ
B(1− Γt−1(ω¯t))RBk,tQBt−1KBt−1 +WB. (3.20)
3.3.5 Bank financing
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), banks are depository institutions that channel
funds from households to small firms.12 In this process, they increase their net
worth by earning return on loans, BSt ,:
NSt = R
S
k,tQ
S
t−1B
S
t−1 −RtDSt−1,
= (RSk,t −Rt)QSt−1BSt−1 +RtNSt−1,
where QSt the real price of the loan claim, N
S
t intermediary’s equity capital and
DSt denotes deposits the intermediary obtains from households. A moral hazard
problem arises because the banker may divert the fraction λSt of total assets back to
his own family in form of large bonuses. The cost to the banker is that depositors
can force the intermediary into bankruptcy and recover the remaining fraction
1− λSt of assets. For depositors to give funds to the banker, the following incentive
constraint must hold:
Vt ≥ λSt QSt BSt .
12Small firms or small corporate finance firms represent a veil, as they costlessly channel funds
from banks to intermediate firms. There is no friction in this process. The financial friction arises
in the relationship between banks and households.
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Unlike Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume that λSt is time-varying. An unex-
pected banking shock resulting from an increase in distrust of the banking sector
by depositors (see, e.g., Dedola et al., 2013) leads to an increase in λSt . This makes
the moral hazard problem worse, as it induces a reduction in funds managed by
banks and subsequently credit tightening.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), banker’s expected terminal wealth can be
rewritten as:
Vt = νtQ
S
t B
S
t + η
S
t N
S
t ,
whereby
νt = Et
{
(1− γS)βΛt,t+1(RSk,t+1 −Rt+1) + βΛt,t+1γSχt,t+1, νt+1
}
, (3.21)
ηSt = Et
{
(1− γS) + βΛt,t+1γSzt,t+1ηSt+1
}
. (3.22)
The variable νt can be interpreted as the expected discounted marginal gain to
the banker of expanding assets by a unit, holding net worth constant, while ηSt is
the expected discounted value of having another unit of net worth, holding assets
constant. χt,t+i ≡ Q
S
t+iB
S
t+i
QSt B
S
t
and zt,t+i ≡ N
S
t+i
NSt
denote growth rates of assets and net
worth, respectively. Parameter γS is the survival probability of bankers.
Furthermore, the agency problem restricts the bank’s leverage ratio to the point
where the incentive to divert funds is exactly balanced by the costs of engaging in
this activity. Hence, the amount of assets that the bank can manage will depend
positively on its net worth as follows:
QSt B
S
t =
ηSt
λSt − νt
NSt , (3.23)
= φSt N
S
t . (3.24)
A random fraction γS of bankers survive each period and accumulate their net
worth based on revenues from bank operations. New bankers receive a start-up
transfer from the household, ωSQSt−1B
S
t−1. Thus, the net worth accumulation reads:
NSt = γ
S[(RSk,t −Rt−1)φt−1 +Rt−1]NSt−1 + ωSQSt−1BSt−1, (3.25)
where RSk,t − Rt−1.13 denotes the bank finance premium. Note that bank loans
extended to small firms are used to finance their capital purchases:
QtK
S
t = QtB
S
t .
In contrast to the case of large firms, I do not specify further characteristics of
small firms, such as a leverage ratio and the value of their assets. They represent a
13Gertler and Karadi (2011) name this term credit spread. For convenience and comparability
to the bond sector, the spread is termed as the premium for bank finance.
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veil that rents capital from capital producers, finances capital purchases by bank
loans and makes the capital available to intermediate goods producers. As a result,
the return on capital is analogous to the case of the large firm:
RSk,t+1 =
rSk,t+1 + (1− δ)QSt+1
QSt
. (3.26)
3.3.6 Capital goods firms
The investment decision is conducted by capital goods firms which are owned by
households. As in the case of external financing, I differentiate between two types
of capital goods producers - each one for providing physical capital of particular
type j, with j ∈ (S,B). In the perfectly competitive environment capital goods
producers employ the undepreciated capital together with investment goods of type
j to produce new capital of the same type. The old capital can be transformed
costlessly into the new capital, whereas the convex adjustment costs are entailed in
the conversion of the investment into new capital:
max
Ijt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt+kΛt,t+k
[
qjt+k
(
1− f
(
Ijt+k
Ijt+k−1
))
Ijt+k − Ijt+k
]
Kjt =
{
(1− δ)Kjt−1 +
(
1− f
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
))
Ijt
}
,
with Ijt denoting investment of type j, Q
j
t the real price of capital of type j.
First order condition for optimal investment reads:
Qjt =
1− βEt
{
Λt,t+1f
′
(
Ijt+1
Ijt
)
Ijt+1
2
Ijt
2
}
1− f
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
− f ′
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
Ijt
Ijt−1
. (3.27)
Note that f
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
= ξ
j
2
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
− 1
)2
. Parameter ξj measures the degree of curva-
ture of investment adjustment cost.
3.3.7 Monetary policy and resource constraint
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor-
type policy rule:
Rnt
Rn
=
(
Rnt−1
Rn
)ρr (pit
pi
)αpi(1−ρr)
εMPt , (3.28)
3.3. THE MODEL 39
where Rn and pi denote the steady-state values for nominal interest rate and
inflation, Rnt and pit, respectively. ε
MP
t is an unexpected monetary policy shock.
The parameter αpi is the weight on inflation, ρr measures the degree of the interest
rate smoothing. Note also that the Fisher relation holds, i.e., Rt =
Rnt
EtΠt+1
.To
complete the model, the aggregate resource constraint is given by:
Yt = Ct + It,
where the aggregate investment is given by It = ηI
S
t + (1− η)IBt . The rental market
for capital and labor market, the market for bonds and bank loans clear implying:∫ ∞
0
KSi,tdi = K
S,a
t = ηK
S
t , (3.29)∫ ∞
0
KSi,tdi = K
B,a
t = (1− η)KBt , (3.30)
Btott = B
tot,B
t +B
tot,S
t , (3.31)
where Btott represents total credit, B
tot,S
t ≡ ηQSt BSt and Btot,Bt ≡ (1− η)(QBt KBt −
NBt ) total values of bank loans and corporate bonds, respectively. I define the bank
loans’ share, Υt, as the ratio of bank loans and corporate bonds:
Υt =
Btot,St
Btot,Bt
. (3.32)
Finally, the goods market clearing requires that the total aggregate demand equals
total aggregate production:
Yt = At(Kt)
α(Lt)
1−α. (3.33)
The shocks follow autoregressive processes given by:
lnAt = ρa lnAt−1 + et,A, (3.34)
lnλSt = (1− ρG) lnλS + ρG lnλSt−1 + et,S, (3.35)
µt =
1
1 + eΞt
, (3.36)
ln Ξt = (1− ρG) ln Ξ + ρG ln Ξt−1 + et,B, (3.37)
where ρA, ρG ∈ (0, 1) and et,x,∼ iid(0, σ2x), whereby x = {A, S,B}. et,S and et,B
denote, respectively, shocks in the banking and bond sector. The specification of
the bond sector shock ensures that monitoring costs µt falls between 0 and 1, as
suggested by Fuentes-Albero (2014). In the following, I consider the banking shock
and the economy-wide financial shock, which is a combination of shocks originating
in both sectors. λS and Ξ represent the steady state values of λSt and Ξt.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Calibration
The time unit is one quarter. The calibration of two sector corporate debt market
matches the characteristics of the US economy and it is presented in table 3.1.
Standard model parameters are calibrated in the vein of Gertler and Karadi (2011).
The discount factor β is calibrated to 0.99. In the household utility function ψL is
chosen so that steady-state working hours are one third, whereas φL, the inverse
of the labor supply elasticity, is set to 0.276. The labor share, 1 − α, is 0.33. The
depreciation rate δ is set at 2.5 percent. In the intermediate goods sector, the
degree of monopolistic competition ε is calibrated at 4.167. The Calvo parameter
θ giving the probability that a firm does not change price is calibrated at 0.779.
which implies that prices in the economy are adjusted every four and a half quarters
on average. The degree of price indexation, ι, is 0.241. As far as monetary policy
is concerned, the autoregressive parameter, ρr, is set to 0.8 and the coefficient on
inflation rate, αpi, to 1.5. I follow Gertler and Karadi (2011) and set the curvature
of investment adjustment cost for both type of capital goods producers, ξj , to 1.728.
The degree of substitutability between the two types of capital services, ρ, is set to
0.6, which is taken from Verona et al. (2013).
Table 3.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Description Target
η 0.263 share of small firms Loans
Bonds
= 0.66
γS 0.957 survival probability of
banker
Leverage: 4
γB 0.979 survival probability of large
firms
Leverage: 2
λS 0.609 fraction of divertible bank
capital
258bp.(annualized)
µ 0.079 monitoring cost (mutual
funds)
BBB-spread:
209bp.(annualised)
F (ωB) 0.0134 default probability SG-debt: 5.37% (an-
nualised)
WB 0.005 transfer from households
Christiano et al.
(2014)
ωS 0.002 transfer from households
Gertler and Karadi
(2011)
The parameters related to the financial sector presented in table 3.1 deserve
some further attention. The share of firms that use bank financing, η, is set so that,
the ratio of bank to bond financing in the US is exactly matched (0.66). The value
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is reported by DeFiore and Uhlig (2011). To obtain the bond finance premium, I use
the spread for BBB-rated corporate debt (relative to the spot Treasury curve).14
I calculate the bank finance premium as the difference between the lending rate
on commercial and industrial loans with moderate risk and the Treasury yield
(with comparable maturity). The annualized premium for bank loans (258 basis
points) is slightly higher than the premium for bond finance (209 basis points).
Note that DeFiore and Uhlig (2011) also report that the loan spread is higher
than the bond spread in the US data. Following Bernanke et al. (1999), I calibrate
the leverage ratios (the ratio of total assets to equity) to 2 for the firm sector
using bond financing, whereas the bank leverage is calibrated to 4, as in Gertler
and Karadi (2011), who argue that the corporate sector is less leveraged than the
financial sector. Together with the premia, the leverage ratios are used to pin down
respectively the survival probabilities of large firms and bankers, γS and γB. The
default probability F (ωB) is set to match the default rate on the US speculative
grade debt (similar to DeFiore and Uhlig, 2011). The idiosyncratic shocks ωB follow
the log-normal distribution with EωB = 1. Evaluating the optimality conditions of
large firms in the steady state, I obtain a value for µB of 0.079 which is smaller than
the value of 0.19 reported by Bernanke et al. (1999). A smaller calibrated parameter
reflects a less severe asymmetric information problem between mutual funds and
large firms, as the former incur lower costs to recover large firms’ returns. Note
that both the steady state value of λ of 0.609 and the banker’s survival probability
of 0.957 differ from the proposed values by Gertler and Karadi (2011). This comes
as a result of the higher bank premia I used to match the data on bank loans. The
steady state values of transfers from households to the large firm and the banking
sector, WB and ωS, are set to 0.005 and 0.002, based on Christiano et al. (2014)
and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Regarding the calibration of shock processes, I specify the standard deviation of
shocks so that the estimated output responses from the SVAR, presented in section
3.2, are exactly matched on impact following aggregate supply and financial shocks
in the third chapter. The persistence parameter is set so that the theoretical response
of output falls within the estimated credible set. The impulse response matching
leads to the following values of parameters: ρA = 0.70, ρG = 0.70, σA = 0.012 and
σS, σB = 0.067. For the economy-wide financial shock, the standard deviation is
chosen to replicate a rise in both bank and bond premia, in addition to matching
the response of output on impact.15
14Note that I assume that a representative US corporate bond security is characterized by BBB
investment grade debt. For example, Denis and Mihov (2003) report that BBB is the median new
debt rating.
15The calibrated shock generates a rise in finance premia, that corresponds to the lower bound
of the credible set of the estimated financial shock, documented in figure B.2. In order to match
the estimated empirical spread for capital market finance, I assume that the shock to monitoring
costs is five times stronger than the shock to the banking sector.
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3.4.2 Model comparison: Does debt composition matter?
To understand how corporate debt financing affects the propagation of the shocks,
I compare the model economy with both bond and bank markets (benchmark case)
with an economy relying only on bank credit.16 Do differences in the composition
of aggregate corporate debt play a role for the real economy? To conduct these
experiments, I set the share of bond sector to 0, which results in one source of
capital and one financial (banking) sector. I also consider an economy without
financial frictions. I assume that all the model economies are hit by a shock process
of the same size.
Figure 3.3: Adverse banking shock
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Note: Green circled lines refer to the dynamics of model economy with the banking
sector, whereas blue lines refer to the benchmark model economy. Red lines denote
bond-sector specific variables, while blue dashed lines denote the bank-specific variables
in the benchmark economy. Label “Benchmark” and “Only Banks” refer, respectively,
to the benchmark model presented in section 3.3 and the model with the banking sector.
Nominal interest rate, bank loans share and finance premia are reported in absolute devi-
ations, the remaining variables are expressed in percentage deviations. Interest rates and
premia are reported in annualized terms. Horizontal axes display quarters after the shock.
16The alternative exercise can refer to the comparison of an economy with a stronger reliance
on bank credit (European-type economy) to an economy with a predominance of capital market
debt (US). The calibrated value for the ratio of bank loans and bonds can be adjusted, so that
it reflects the debt composition (aggregate bank loans and corporate bonds) in Europe. The
European-type model economy would fall in between the two model economies considered above.
3.4. RESULTS 43
Figure 3.3 displays the responses of the two model economies with financial
markets to the banking shock. It is a rather simple way to proxy for a negative
financial shock that can be a result of a confidence loss in the banking sector (as
described by Dedola et al., 2013) and leads to tightening in lending standards.
The shock increases the incentive of bankers to divert assets which makes their
leverage constraint tighter. Banks reduce the amount of intermediated loans for
a given value of net worth. Under these circumstances of the disruption in bank
intermediation, finance premia on loans need to increase to make bank operations
profitable. The propagation of the banking shock is effective mainly through the
bank-lending channel. As small firms are only dependent on bank finance, they
curtail their investment spending as a result of loan supply restrictions. Lower
capital demand leads to a decline in the price of capital and investment of firms
dependent on bank financing, which results in a decline of real output.
The adverse banking shock affects only the banking sector and leads to a
substantial rise in bank finance premia (by the same amount in both economies)
and no change in the premium for bond finance. The reason is that the bond
market is not affected by the banking shock, i.e., the determinants of the bond
finance premia (the leverage ratio of large firms and the default threshold) remain
unchanged.
Real output and investment in the banking sector economy fall more than
three times as much as in the benchmark model. The reactions of output and
investment are attenuated in the benchmark model economy, as there is a stronger
substitution along the intensive margin from loans to bonds (c.f., a decline in the
loan-to-bond ratio in figure 3.3). This credit market development following the
negative banking shock in the benchmark model nicely represents the changes in
the debt composition in figure B.1 reported by Adrian et al. (2012).
It might not be surprising that the tightening of bank credit standards, which
is reflected in the tightening of banks’ incentive constraints, results in stronger real
effects in the banking model economy. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that this
finding is in line with the empirical evidence by Gambetti and Musso (2017). The
authors document that the real short-term effects of loan supply shocks are stronger
in Europe than in the US. Their loan supply shock, identified by an increase in
the lending rate and a decline in the credit volume on impact in their SVAR, is
consistent with the initial reactions of respective variables in my theoretical setup.
It is interesting to note that the composition of corporate debt helps to mitigate
the negative effects of the financial shock. As the sector dependent on bond finance
is not affected by the shock, large firms can issue bonds to finance their purchases
of capital. As a result, there is little change in their investment spending. For this
reason, a decline in the aggregate investment is mostly due to the reductions in
investment spending of small firms using bank finance (to be shown in figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.4: Adverse monetary policy shock
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Note: Green circled lines refer to the dynamics of model economy with the banking
sector labeled “Only Banks”, whereas black lines with squares refer to the model
economy without financial frictions labeled “NoFF”. Blue lines refer to the benchmark
model economy labeled “Benchmark”. Red dashed lines denote bond-sector specific
variables, while blue lines denote the bank-specific variables in the benchmark economy.
Nominal interest rate, bank loans share and finance premia are reported in absolute
deviations, the remaining variables are expressed in percentage deviations. Interest
rates and premia are reported in annualized terms. The adverse shock corresponds to
one percentage point increase in the nominal interest rate.
The short-lived reaction of the aggregate investment matches well my empirical
impulse response functions presented in figure B.2. The theoretical model predicts
a stronger decline in the bank loans’ share than the one in empirical counterpart.
Overall, the model does well in mimicking the empirical dynamics of investment,
nominal interest rate and spreads.
Figure 3.3 also highlights a recovery in the banking sector in both economies. In
the context of high bank finance premia, banks’ profitability improves rapidly and
trust in the banking system is restored. As a consequence, banks’ balance sheet
conditions stabilize and banks are willing to extend loans to small firms.
Figure 3.4 depicts the dynamics of key financial and aggregate variables in the
benchmark model, the model with only a banking sector and the model without
financial frictions following a contractionary monetary policy shock (one percentage
point increase in the nominal interest rate). First, as has been emphasized before in
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the literature,17 the presence of financial frictions exacerbates the negative effects of
monetary policy shocks by intensifying their effects on investment and the price of
capital. Second, leveraged banks reduce credit lines to small firms in order to meet
their capital requirements, which leads to a substantial decline in investment and
output in the bank-dependent sector. On the other hand, the rise in bond issuance,
which is extended to large firms via mutual funds, enables these firms not to divest
as strongly as the small firm sector dependent on bank financing. As a result, the
reactions of investment and output are attenuated in the benchmark economy.
Mutual funds do not need to fulfil any capital requirements, and, therefore, are
willing to provide bond financing in return for high bond premia.
Figure 3.5: Adverse technology shock
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Note: Green circled lines refer to the dynamics of model economy with the banking
sector labeled “Only Banks”, whereas black lines with squares refer to the model
economy without financial frictions labeled “NoFF”. Blue lines refer to the benchmark
model economy labeled “Benchmark”. Red dashed lines denote bond-sector specific
variables, while blue lines denote the bank-specific variables in the benchmark economy.
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The dynamic consequences of a technology shock are shown in figure 3.5. The
initial development of the loan-to-bond ratio and the propagation of a technology
17See, for example, Gerali et al. (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) among others.
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shock with respect to investment matches well my empirical evidence on aggregate
supply shocks reported in figure B.3. The technology shock affects mainly the
production capability of the intermediate goods producers, who reduce capital
demand in the face of lower productivity. This induces a fall in external financing,
with slight differences between the sectors and two different model economies. As
the needs for external financing in the bond and banking sector develop similarly,
the debt composition changes only slightly and does not matter for real output.18
Note that the changes in finance premia following the technology shock are
much smaller than the largest response of finance premia in the banking shock
scenario. Similarly, the other financial variables are much less sensitive to the
technology shock. Therefore, the propagation of the shock through the financial
sector is rather negligible. Over time, banks reduce provision of loans relatively
less compared to the bond issuance volumes, which can be seen in the increase of
the loan-to-bond ratio, i.e., the bank loans’ share.
3.4.3 Inspecting the mechanism: Financial and monetary
policy shocks
In order to better understand the role of variation in the corporate debt composition
(as a result of an increase in bond issuance), I examine further monetary and
financial shocks. Figure 3.6 displays the impulse responses of some key real and
financial variables to an adverse financial shock affecting the bank and bond
market simultaneously in the benchmark economy. In particular, this financial
shock leads to an increase in distrust of the banking sector and a tightening of
monitoring standards by mutual funds. The reason for this specification is to
match my SVAR evidence with respect to increases in the premium for bank debt
and non-bank debt.19
The dynamic effects of the financial shock on investment, output and
debt-related variables match very well their empirical counterparts presented in
figure B.2. Note that the model replicates the rebound in investment documented
in the SVAR model together with the development of bank and non-bank premia.
It generates a stronger decline in the share of bank to bond finance than the one in
the data (see figure B.2 in appendix B). The impulse response of most endogenous
variables closely track their empirical counterparts during the considered period.
The unexpected confidence loss in the banking sector makes banks’ balance
18The effects of the technology shock shock in the benchmark economy are discussed in appendix
B. For completeness, I also comment on demand shocks modeled as preference shocks.
19Both banking shock and combined financial shock result in a disproportionate rise in the
premium for the bank debt relative to the non-bank debt, as documented in the SVAR evidence.
The specification of a combined financial shock generates additionally a rise in the bond finance
premium.
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Figure 3.6: Adverse financial shock
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Note: Blue dashed lines refer to the variables associated with the banking sector,
whereas the red circled lines refer to the bond sector. Black lines refer to the aggregates.
Finance premia and the bank loans share are reported in absolute deviations, the
remaining variables are expressed in percentage deviations.
sheets deteriorate, reducing the amount of the intermediated credit and banks’
net worth. Banks start the process of de-leveraging, which comes to an end after
five periods. The bank lending channel highlights the role of bank loan supply for
small firms’ investments. As small firms are only dependent on bank finance, they
reduce their investments in the presence of restricted loan supply and a falling
price of capital. The decline in the price of capital20 leads to a rise in the expected
return on capital in small firms. The buildup of capital and the rebound in the
price of capital is associated with the higher investment demand after ten periods,
which is then financed through recapitalized banks.
Interestingly, the model predicts a fast recovery of the banking sector. The
reason is that banks can rather quickly restore their profitability by charging high
loan premia. As a consequence, banks stabilize their balance sheet positions and
start extending loans to firms. Once the banks are capitalized, they intermediate
loans that the small firm sector uses for financing capital purchases.
There is a substitution towards the cheaper source of financing (bond financing).
20The financial shock gives rise to the financial-accelerator mechanism first explained by
Bernanke et al. (1999), because the decline in investment decreases the asset price, further
decreasing the firm’s net worth and investment.
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The finance premium on bonds is affected slightly due to an unexpected rise in
monitoring costs by mutual funds; large firms’ leverage and net worth change
negligibly. Slightly leveraged large firms are able to obtain bond financing, as
unconstrained mutual funds underwrite bond contracts in return for an increased
finance premium. Given rather good financial positions, large firms can provide
the necessary financing of physical capital, and, therefore, there is an increase
in bond issuance. It follows that the investment of the large firm sector changes
by little. At the production level, there is also a substitution towards the
cheaper source of capital. As a result of small changes in the prices of capital and
the capital demand, the investment spending of large firms is not altered very much.
Figure 3.7: Adverse monetary policy shock
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Note: Blue dashed lines refer to the variables associated with the banking sector,
whereas the red circled lines refer to the bond sector. Black lines refer to the aggregates.
Finance premia and the bank loans share are reported in absolute deviations, the
remaining variables are expressed in percentage deviations.
Figure 3.7 presents the responses of key variables in the benchmark model
following a negative monetary policy shock. An unexpected increase in the policy
rate leads to a decline in the aggregate demand. The lower demand for goods and
capital depresses inflation and the price of capital. The decline in capital prices
decreases large firms’ and banks’ net worth, which worsens their balance sheet
positions and leads to a higher leverage. As a result, both finance premia increase
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after a contractionary monetary policy shock.
The reactions of most sector-specific variables are very similar; however, bank
premia do increase more than bond premia which leads to a relatively smaller
decline in investment by firms using bond financing. The relative decline in the
ratio of loans to bonds indicates that the corporate debt composition changes in
favor of bonds following monetary policy shocks, and, therefore, the model matches
well the SVAR evidence by Kashyap et al. (1996) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996).
The decline in the loan-to-bond ratio comes as a result of different dynamics
of the two sectors. Bond issuance increases in order to fill in the gap between the
purchases of capital and the net worth of large firms. The contractionary monetary
shock causes the default threshold for these firms to rise, which makes the bond
financing more expensive, as depicted by a rise in the bond finance premium. The
optimal debt contract implies that higher bond issuance comes hand in hand with
higher finance premia. The capital market channel highlights the role of bond
finance premia in the provision of external financing. Unconstrained mutual funds
are accordingly compensated for default risks of leveraged large firms. On the
other hand, banks find that their balance sheets shrink as a result of lower prices
of capital. The net worth of bankers is also negatively affected, which implies a
tighter leverage constraint and a reduction in the intermediate funds. The higher
bank leverage calls for an increase in the finance premium on loans. Investments
conducted by the small firm sector is affected more as a result of banks’ leverage
constraints and higher loan premia.
The model shows that the transmission of monetary policy shocks, as depicted
in figure 3.7, is altered if the heterogeneity of sectors relying on different types of
financing is considered. The propagation of the shock through the bank-lending
channel has already been documented in the literature (see, e.g., Gertler and Karadi,
2011). My model setup highlights the attenuating role of the capital market finance
channel, and, hence, the relevance of the corporate debt composition.
3.5 Conclusion
The Great Recession featured a surge in corporate bond issuance and a decline
in bank loans in the US, which indicates that the corporate debt composition
changes over the business cycle (c.f., Adrian et al., 2012). This work addresses
the relevance of the corporate debt composition for the aggregate economy in the
following manner: First, I provide new empirical evidence on the dynamics of output,
investment, the corporate debt composition and premia on the bank and non-bank
debt. Second, I develop a DSGE model with bond and loan financing which succeeds
in matching my SVAR evidence on real investment spending following financial
and supply shocks and the evidence on monetary policy shocks by Kashyap et al.
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(1996). Third, I consider different model economies in order to understand the role
of the corporate debt composition in the propagation of economic shocks.
My empirical results highlight different conditional dynamics of corporate
debt. In particular, the corporate debt composition reacts strongly to financial
shocks, while at the same time the reaction of investment is short-lived. Estimated
aggregate demand and supply shocks generate a persistent decline in investment
and a persistent variation in corporate debt. The proposed DSGE model replicates
well the dynamics of investment and the corporate debt composition following
financial and macroeconomic shocks.
To what extent does the debt composition matter for output and investment?
To understand how the availability of bank and bond finance affects the propagation
of shocks, I compare an economy with both a bond market and a banking sector
(benchmark economy) to an economy relying only on bank credit. The results
indicate that access to bond financing reduces the negative effects of adverse
financial and monetary policy shocks on the real economy. The intuition is the
following: Shocks which affect bank’s balance sheets in an adverse way lead to a
reduction in funds intermediated by banks and a rise in bank finance premia. The
reason is that leveraged banks have to comply with capital requirements. The bank
lending channel highlights how the unavailability of bank loans for small firms
adversely affects the investment spending of these firms. Mutual funds, which are
not subject to any leverage constraints, are willing to underwrite bonds in return
for higher bond finance premia. The effective capital market channel exemplifies
the financing channel of large firms, which attenuates the effects of contractionary
shocks on the investment of large firms. The interplay of the bank lending and
capital market channels leads to the cyclical variation in the aggregate corporate
debt composition. This is relevant for the propagation of financial and monetary
shocks in the economy because the sector dependent on bank finance reduces
investment much more than the sector dependent on bond finance. The model
suggests the change in corporate debt composition (i.e., capital market finance)
can help absorb some business cycle fluctuations. If bank credit is the only source
of external finance, real investment and output are affected more than in the case
of the benchmark economy. This result is in line with the empirical findings by
Gambetti and Musso (2017), who document a stronger short-term real effect of
loan supply shocks in Europe than in the US.
This paper offers one theoretical explanation for the empirical evidence on the
corporate debt dynamics. It highlights the role of the bank lending and capital
market channels in the cyclical variations in corporate debt and its repercussions
for investment spending of firms. Furthermore, the aspects associated with the
richer heterogeneity of corporate debt, policy actions aimed at improving lending
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conditions or the availability of capital market finance are not considered here.
This extensions is a part of the following chapter.
Chapter 4
An optimal policy mix for
segmented credit markets
Abstract
This paper analyzes welfare-improving central bank’s policy
rules within the context of a medium-scale DSGE model with a
banking and a bond credit market in the presence of economy-wide
and sectoral shocks. A combination of a Taylor policy rule, an
unconventional bank credit policy and a bond-sector macroprudential
tool stabilizes the macroeconomy and attains the highest level of
welfare in the economy where both credit markets are affected by
financial shocks. The main reason is that non-standard policies
are effective at dampening the financial cycle, improving credit
conditions and, even providing an additional stimulus to the
economy. The welfare gains dissipate if shocks do not originate in
the financial sector. If the central bank cannot correctly identify a
sector-specific financial shock, and follows the policy mix conditional
on economy-wide financial shocks, the level of welfare is comparable
to the one under the optimal policy. However, welfare gains of
optimized policies over the simple Taylor rule depends on the source
of sectoral shock.
JEL Classification: E30, E44, E50.
Keywords: Optimal policy, Taylor rule, credit policy, macropruden-
tial tool, credit market imbalances.
4.1 Introduction
The conduct of central banks’ monetary policy has changed substantially in the
aftermath of the financial crisis starting in 2008. Central banks all around the
world implemented different unconventional monetary policy measures1 to tackle
1See, c.f., the review of unconventional measures by Borio and Zabai (2016). All major central
banks, e.g., Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan adjusted their balance sheets
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disruptions in the financial sector. To address possible future risks emanating from
the financial system, central banks have established macroprudential frameworks2
to maintain and pursue financial stability. Both sets of these measures imply that
central banks extended their spectrum of policy tools. What is the optimal choice of
the central bank’s policy instruments to help the economy’s response to aggregate
fluctuations?
In a seminal paper by Cu´rdia and Woodford (2011), the authors conclude
that the use of unconventional policy instruments should be tailored to conditions
specific to disrupted financial markets. Motivated by the importance of influencing
conditions in financial market segments with the appropriate policy, I analyze an
interaction between interest rate policy and two different credit policy instruments
in a financial DSGE model. The financial sector consists of a bond market, where
mutual funds make bond financing available to large firms, and a banking market,
where banks supply loans to small firms.3
This analysis of the central bank’s optimal policy setup tries to merge two
strands of literature: the rich literature on optimal monetary and credit policy
instruments, and the emerging literature on macroprudential frameworks.4 In my
theoretical model, two credit policy instruments are designed to respond to credit
imbalances in the respective credit market segment. They are specified as follows:
The unconventional bank policy instrument is inversely related to bank lending
activities and, therefore, represents a form of state intervention in the banking sector,
similar to the modeling of the policy in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The central bank
can support private credit flows to small firms, but the public intermediation is less
efficient than bank intermediation. The bond policy instrument, modeled along the
lines of Kannan et al. (2012), is a countercyclical macroprudential tool that affects
directly funding costs of large firms and dampens credit fluctuations in the bond
sector. The standard monetary policy instrument is a Taylor-type policy rule5 for
the nominal interest rate. The sources of business cycles are technology shocks
and financial shocks. I differentiate between economy-wide and sectoral financial
in order to influence financial conditions. One dimension of these balance sheet policies is credit
policy - operations that target private debt, banks and securities markets.
2Macroprudential policies are aimed at closely monitoring developments in financial markets
and promptly reacting to possible financial imbalances in the form of asset price bubbles or
excessive credit buildups. For example, the Bank of England, unlike the Federal Reserve, in the
US, has the authority to conduct macroprudential policy (c.f., Gelain and Ilbas, 2017).
3The model setup is developed in the third chapter. The reliance of large firms on the bond
market and small firms on banks is meant to capture the empirical finding by Colla et al. (2013)
on the debt specialization of large and small US firms.
4In the context of DSGE models with one financial (credit) market, see the analysis of optimal
credit policy in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler et al. (2012)
among others; for welfare implications of macroprudential policies, see Gelain and Ilbas (2017)
and Bailliu et al. (2015). Note that there are numerous studies addressing the interaction of these
policies in the context of housing market (e.g., Kannan et al., 2012; Quint and Rabanal, 2014) or
open economy (e.g., Dedola et al., 2013; Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2015).
5These rules have a good empirical fit (see Taylor, 1993).
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shocks. Bank sector shocks emanate from a (dis)trust in banks, whereas bond sector
shocks change auditing costs by mutual funds. The economy-wide financial shock
is a combination of both sectoral shocks. I perform a welfare comparison of the
simple Taylor rule, the optimized Taylor rule and the policy mix of credit policy
and interest rate policy instruments.
My model featuring a segmented financial market can replicate the results
from the previous literature on non-standard policy measures in the context of
one single financial market (see, e.g., Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2010; Bailliu et al.,
2015; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2011). The key results
on economy-wide shocks can be summarized as follows: First, the highest welfare
gain of the combined credit and interest rate policies over the simple (optimal)
Taylor rule is achieved if the economy is affected by economy-wide financial shocks.
By addressing a particular credit market segment, these non-standard policies
are effective at dampening the financial cycle, improving credit conditions and
even providing an additional stimulus to the economy. Second, if the policy maker
does not implement the mix of all three policy instruments, my model predicts
that welfare losses are limited in the presence of technology shocks. The reason is
that non-financial shocks do not cause substantial disruptions in respective credit
market segments, so that there are no large benefits from the non-standard policies.
Third, of the three policy designs that are being compared, my optimized policy
mix achieves an outcome closest to the Ramsey optimal policy.
I make several contributions to the literature in the context of sectoral financial
shocks. First, if the policy marker wrongly identifies a sector-specific financial
disturbance, acting upon economy-wide financial shocks attains virtually the same
level of welfare as the optimal policy mix. The intuition for this result is the following:
The propagation of bank sector shocks resembles the model economy dynamics
following economy-wide shocks (in terms of large disruptions in bank lending and a
substantial rise in bank premia) and, therefore, the optimized policy in the economy
affected by the latter shocks performs well also in the economy with bank sector
shocks. In the presence of bond sector shocks both optimal and non-optimal policies
cannot accommodate the effects of these shocks, yielding comparable welfare results.
Second, I find that the source of sectoral financial disturbance matters. In the
context of my model, high welfare losses arise irrespectively of the policy setting
if the economy is affected by shocks originating in the bond sector. In particular,
the optimal combination of unconventional policy tools does not compress a rise in
bond premia, and therefore, does not offset disruptions in the bond market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model setup. Section 3 discusses the main results. Section 4 concludes.
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4.2 The model
The starting point is the model developed in chapter three. I consider two credit
market sectors, a banking sector and a bond sector. Small firms rely on bank
finance, whereas large firms issue bonds to match the notion of debt specialization
of large and small US firms (see Cantillo and Wright, 2000). Banks are modeled as
depository institutions, following the setup by Gertler and Karadi (2011). Due to a
moral hazard problem between depositors and banks, banks can supply only as
much credit to small firms as allowed by their leverage constraint. Mutual funds
represent a veil, as in Bernanke et al. (1999). The terms of the optimal bond
contract specify the amounts of bonds as well as bond finance premia.
The model economy is populated by the following agents: households, corporate
finance firms, intermediate firms, final goods firms, capital goods producers, lending
banks and mutual funds. Households consume, supply labor and save via depositing
resources with financial intermediaries. Two types of corporate finance firms make
financing decisions regarding bank loans and corporate bonds, respectively, in
order to finance their investments in physical capital. Intermediate goods sector
is monopolistically competitive. These firms combine the physical capital from
two sectors with labor to produce differentiated products and set prices. Capital
goods firms make investment decisions. Final goods producers combine all the
intermediate goods and make it available to households and capital producers in
form of consumption and investment goods. The central bank conducts monetary
policy by following a Taylor policy rule. The central bank has at its disposal two
sector-specific policy instruments to stabilize financial imbalances in the respective
credit market. The bank policy instrument is inversely related to the bank lending
activity and represents a form of state intervention in the banking sector. The
bond policy instrument is a countercyclical tool that affects credit fluctuations in
the bond sector. Since the details of the model have been discussed in the third
chapter, I present the equilibrium conditions and definitions of respective economic
relationships. I also include the changes in relevant equilibrium conditions as a
result of bank credit policy or bond macroprudential tool.
The consumption Euler equation and the household labor supply condition take
the following forms:
λt = Et {βRtλt+1} , (4.1)
wt =
ψL L
φL
t
λt
, (4.2)
where λt ≡ 1(Ct−hCt−1) −
βh
(EtCt+1−hCt) denotes the Lagrange multiplier. Ct represents
real aggregate consumption, Lt labor hours, wt real wage rate, and Rt the real risk-
free gross return between t− 1 and t from holdings of real one-period government
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bonds. Et is the expectational operator conditional on information available at
time t. Parameters 0 < β < 1, 0 < h < 1, ψL, φL > 0 denote, respectively, the
household’s discount factor, the external habit formation parameter, the weight on
the disutility of labor and the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.
Total capital is the composite of two bundles of sectoral capital, i.e., capital of
individual small and large corporate finance firms, KSt and K
B
t , respectively, and
it is given by:6
Kt =
[
η(KSt )
ρ + (1− η)(KBt )ρ
] 1
ρ , (4.3)
where ρ > 0 is the degree of substitutability between the two types of capital and
0 < η < 1 the share of small corporate finance firms. The capital of type j has the
following law of motion:
Kjt =
{
(1− δ)Kjt−1 +
(
1− f
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
))
Ijt
}
, (4.4)
with Ijt , K
j
t denoting investment and capital of type j, with j ∈ (S,B). Note that
f
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
= ξ
j
2
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
− 1
)2
. Parameter ξj > 0 and 0 < δ < 1 measure the degree of
curvature of investment adjustment cost and the depreciation rate, respectively.
The equilibrium condition for optimal investment of type j reads:
Qjt =
1− βEt
{
Λt,t+1f
′
(
Ijt+1
Ijt
)
Ijt+1
2
Ijt
2
}
1− f
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
− f ′
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
Ijt
Ijt−1
, (4.5)
with Λt,t+1 ≡ λt+1λt denoting the real stochastic discount factor and Q
j
t the real price
of capital of type j.
The average gross return on capital in the specific sector is given by:
Rjk,t+1 =
rjk,t+1 + (1− δ)Qjt+1
Qjt
. (4.6)
6Similar to Verona et al. (2013), in my framework the individual members are identical within
each group, i.e., KS,at = ηK
S
t and K
B,a
t = (1 − η)KBt , whereby KS,at and KB,at represent the
sector-specific bundles of capital. Hence, the total capital can be also written in terms of sectoral
capital bundles: Kt =
[
η1−ρ(KS,at )
ρ + (1− η)1−ρ(KB,at )ρ
] 1
ρ
.
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where rjk,t denotes the rental price of capital of type j. From the firm’s cost
minimization problem, the rental price of capital is determined by:
rjk,t =
[
αAtst
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α (
Kjt
)ρ−1
K
1
ρ
−1
t
] 1
α
, (4.7)
where st stands for the average real marginal cost and parameter 0 < α < 1 is the
share of total capital in the production function. The optimality condition for the
choice of particular type of capital and labor hours result in:
rk,Bt
rk,St
=
(
KBt
KSt
)ρ−1
, (4.8)
wt = st
αY mt
Lt
. (4.9)
The intermediate goods production is determined by:
Y mt = At(Kt)
αL1−αt , (4.10)
where At represents aggregate technology.
Equilibrium conditions associated with the optimal choice of price give rise to
the New Keynesian Phillips curve with price indexation, expressed in the recursive
form using equations:
Π∗t =

− 1
Fmt
Zmt
Πt, (4.11)
where Fmt and Z
m
t are defined as F
m
t ≡ Y mt st + βθEtΛt,t+1Πt+1Π−ιt Fmt+1 and
Zmt ≡ Y mt + βθEtΛt,t+1Π−1t+1Π−ι(−1)t Zmt+1. The parameter 0 ≤ ι ≤ 1 measures the
degree of price indexation. Parameters 0 < θ < 1,  > 0 denote, respectively, the
probability that an intermediate firm cannot adjust its price and the elasticity of
substitution between different intermediate goods.
Aggregate output, Yt, is related to the aggregate intermediate output, Y
m
t , in
the following way:
Y mt = Yt∆t, (4.12)
where ∆t measures the price dispersion, which is given by:
∆t = θ∆t−1ΠtΠ
−ι
t−1 + (1− θ)
−1
−1
(
1− θΠ−1t Π−θ(−1)t−1
) 
−1
. (4.13)
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), the equilibrium conditions associated with
the banking sector specify the marginal gain from expanding bank assets, νt, the
marginal gain of an additional unit of net worth, ηSt , the growth rate of bank net
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worth, zt,t+i, and the growth rate of bank capital, χt,t+i:
νt = Et
{
(1− γS)βΛt,t+1(RSk,t+1 −Rt) + βΛt,t+1γSχt,t+1νt+1
}
, (4.14)
ηSt = Et
{
(1− γS) + βΛt,t+1γSzt,t+1ηSt+1
}
, (4.15)
zt−1,t = (RSk,t −Rt−1)(1− τSt−1)(φSt−1) + Rt−1, (4.16)
χt−1,t =
{
φSt (1− τSt )
φSt−1(1− τSt−1)
}
zt−1,t, (4.17)
where RSk,t − Rt−1 denotes the bank finance premium. Parameter 0 < γS < 1 is
the survival probability of bankers. The term (1− τSt )φSt ≡ (1−τ
S
t )Q
S
t B
S
t
NSt
denotes the
average bank leverage ratio and NSt bank net worth. The definitions of growth
rates are the following: χt,t+i ≡ Q
S
t+iB
S
p,t+i
QSt B
S
p,t
and zt,t+i ≡ N
S
t+i
NSt
. The total value of bank
loans of a representative small firm is given by:
QSt B
S
t = Q
S
t B
S
p,t +Q
S
t B
S
g,t,
= QSt B
S
p,t + τ
S
t Q
S
t B
S
t .
where QSt B
S
p,t is the value of loans intermediated by banks and Q
S
t B
S
g,t loans
intermediated by the central bank. Similar to Gertler and Karadi (2011), the credit
policy instrument, τSt , determines the fraction of bank loans intermediated by the
policy maker. With the state intervention in place, equations (4.16) and (4.17) are
changed in comparison to the third chapter in order to account for bank loans
intermediated by the central bank. Any central bank’s earnings from the state
intervention are transferred to households in the form of lump-sum transfers.
The agency problem gives rise to the leverage constraint of banks:
φSt =
1
(1− τSt )
ηSt
(λSt − νt)
. (4.18)
The leverage ratio is increasing for two reasons: the excess value of bank’s assets,
i.e., loans, νt, and additional value from holding another unit of net worth, η
S
t . The
leverage ratio declines in λSt , a fraction of funds diverted by bankers. Following
Dedola et al. (2013), I assume that λSt is time varying and captures a shock to the
confidence in the banking system. Hence, an increase in λSt , implies that depositors
can recover less funds from banks. This action leads to the tightening of the leverage
constraint and, hence, causes a disruption in bank intermediation, since banks
reduce the amount of loans to small firms.
The evolution of bank net worth is given by:
NSt = γ
S[(RSk,t −Rt−1)φSt−1 +Rt−1]NSt−1 + ωS(1− τSt−1)QSt−1BSt−1. (4.19)
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Net worth gets accumulated from revenues of bank operations (of surviving bankers)
and a start-up transfer from the household, ωS(1− τSt−1)QSt−1BSt−1. Note that the
total value of bank loans extended to representative small firms (corporate finance
firms) is used to finance their capital purchases:
QSt K
S
t = Q
S
t B
S
t . (4.20)
The representative firm that relies on bond finance uses her own net worth and
bonds to finance capital purchases. Hence, the large corporate finance firm, or for
convenience, large firm issues the following amount of bonds:
BBt = Q
B
t K
B
t −NBt .
Solving the optimal bond contract,7 I obtain that the relationship between the
return on capital and the bond finance premium is given by:
EtR
B
k,t+1 = Et[ρ(ω¯
B
t+1)Rt] exp(τ
B
t ), (4.21)
ρ(ω¯Bt+1) =
Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1)
[(Γt(ω¯Bt+1)− µt+1Gt(ω¯Bt+1))Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1) + (1− Γt(ω¯Bt+1))(Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1)− µt+1G′t(ω¯Bt+1))]
(4.22)
where ρ(ω¯t+1) represents the bond finance premium and τ
B
t is the macroprudential
policy instrument. The bond policy instrument is an exogenous component of the
bond premium, that aims to dampen credit cycles in the bond market. Γt(ω¯
B
t+1) ≡
(1−Ft(ω¯Bt+1))+
∫ ω¯Bt+1
0
ωdFt(ω
B) andGt(ω¯
B
t+1) ≡
∫ ω¯Bt+1
0
ωBdFt(ω
B). Γt(·) and µt+1Gt(·)
denote respectively the share of large firms’ earnings received by the mutual fund and
the expected monitoring costs. Ft(ω¯
B
t+1) is a cumulative distribution function (and
the probability of default) of idiosyncratic productivity, ωB. Similar to Bernanke
et al. (1999), I assume that ωBt is log normally distributed with E(ω
B
t ) = 1
and V ar(lnωBt ) = σω
2. I allow for monitoring costs to be time-varying in order
to model the change in the auditing ability of mutual funds. For example, an
unexpected increase in monitoring costs makes the verification of the large firm’s
project outcomes costlier, i.e., it increases the bond premium.
The zero profit condition of mutual funds is as follows:
Et
{
[Γt(ω¯t+1)− µt+1Gt(ω¯t+1)]Q
B
t K
B
t
NBt
RBk,t+1
Rt
}
=
QBt K
B
t
NBt
− 1, (4.23)
7See, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999).
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which can be related to the average leverage ratio of large firms, φBt ≡ Q
B
t B
B
t
NBt
.
The law of motion for large firms’ net worth is given by:
NBt = γ
B(1− Γt−1(ω¯t))RBk,tQBt−1KBt−1 +WB, (4.24)
where WB denotes a constant lump-sum transfer of households and parameter
0 < γB < 1 determines the fraction of the large firm earnings’ share that is
accumulated by large firms. Large firms default on bonds if the realization of the
idiosyncratic productivity falls below the threshold productivity, which is given by:
ω¯t+1 =
Zt
(
QBt K
B
t −NBt
)
RBk,t+1Q
B
t K
B
t
, (4.25)
where Zt denotes the contractual, no-default interest rate on corporate bonds.
8
The capital rental market and the credit market clear:∫ ∞
0
KSi,tdi = K
S,a
t = ηK
S
t , (4.26)∫ ∞
0
KSi,tdi = K
B,a
t = (1− η)KBt , (4.27)
Btott = B
tot,B
t +B
tot,S
t , (4.28)
where Btott represents total credit, B
tot,S
t ≡ ηQSt BSt and Btot,Bt ≡ (1− η)(QBt KBt −
NBt ) total values of bank loans and corporate bonds, respectively. I define the bank
loan’s share, Υt, as the ratio of bank loans between corporate bonds:
Υt =
Btot,St
Btot,Bt
. (4.29)
The aggregate resource constraint is given by:9
Yt = Ct + It + cητ
S
t Q
S
t−1K
S
t−1,
where the last term represents resource costs associated with the intervention in the
banking sector. Note that the aggregate investment is given by It = ηI
S
t +(1−η)IBt .
Parameter c denotes the efficiency costs per unit of central bank’s assets, calibrated
as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). Note also that the Fisher relation holds:
Rt =
Rnt
EtΠt+1
, (4.30)
8The contractual bond interest rate is associated with the threshold productivity, ω¯, i.e., the
value of idiosyncratic productivity is such that the large firm’s net worth is completely eliminated
and the firm is exactly able to pay off the corporate bond.
9I assume that the monitoring costs of mutual funds do not deplete the aggregate output and
are transferred as a lump sum to households.
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where Rnt denotes the nominal interest rate.
The shocks follow autoregressive processes given by:
lnAt = ρa lnAt−1 + et,A, (4.31)
lnλSt = (1− ρG) lnλS + ρG lnλSt−1 + et,S, (4.32)
µt =
1
1 + eΞt
, (4.33)
ln Ξt = (1− ρG) ln Ξ + ρG ln Ξt−1 + et,B, (4.34)
where ρA, ρG ∈ (0, 1) and et,x,∼ iid(0, σ2x), whereby x = {A, S,B}. et,S and et,B
denote, respectively, sectoral shocks in banking and bond sector. The specification
of the bond-sector shock ensures that monitoring cost µt falls between 0 and 1, as
suggested by Fuentes-Albero (2014). Note that I also consider the economy-wide
financial shock, which is a combination of two sectoral shocks. λS and Ξ represent
the steady state values of λSt and Ξt.
4.2.1 Welfare measure and policy rules
To assess the welfare implications of policy rules, I specify the welfare measure as
the unconditional lifetime household utility:
Wt = E
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Lt), (4.35)
with the period utility U(Ct, Lt) ≡ ln(Ct − hCt−1)− ψL1+φLL
1+φL
t .
Following Lucas (1987, 2003); Faia and Monacelli (2007), I calculate the wel-
fare costs associated with each policy regime. These costs are expressed as the
compensation, g, that households would require to remain indifferent between the
stochastic economy and the deterministic steady-state environment. This fraction
can be determined from the following equation:
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Lt) = E
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1 + g)C¯, L¯), (4.36)
where C¯ and L¯ denote the deterministic steady state values of Ct and Lt. The left
hand side represents the unconditional expectation of welfare which is obtained
using a second-order Taylor approximation, whereas the right hand side is the
welfare in the deterministic steady state.10
For the welfare comparison of policy regimes, I consider the family of simple
interest rules in the form of simple Taylor rules in each policy specification. In the
case where the central bank employs a mix of all three instruments I relate two
10See further details in appendix C.
62 CHAPTER 4. POLICY MIX FOR SEGMENTED CREDIT MARKETS
credit policy instruments, τSt and τ
B
t , to credit imbalances in the respective credit
market. Hence, the specifications of policy rules I compare are given by:
1. Simple Taylor rule :
Rnt
Rn
=
(
Rnt−1
Rn
)ρr (pit
pi
)αpi(1−ρr)
, (4.37)
2. Optimized simple Taylor rule:
Rnt
Rn
=
(
Rnt−1
Rn
)ρr (
pit
pi
)αpi(1−ρr)
,
3. Optimized policy combination:
Optimized simple Taylor rule:
Rnt
Rn
=
(
Rnt−1
Rn
)ρr (pit
pi
)αpi(1−ρr)
,
Bank sector policy instrument:
τSt = τ
S − νS ln
(
BSt
BSt−1
)
, (4.38)
Bond sector policy instrument:
τBt = τ
B − νB ln
(
BBt
BBt−1
)
, (4.39)
where Rn and Π denote the steady-state values for the nominal interest rate and
inflation, Rnt and Πt, respectively. The parameter αpi is the weight on inflation,
ρr measures the degree of interest rate smoothing. Parameters νS, νB ≥ 0 denote,
respectively, the unconventional policy instruments are not used in the steady state
and, therefore, the value of both instruments, τB and τS, is 0. Along the lines of
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), I consider constrained-optimal rules: For cases
2. and 3., I search for the value of policy coefficient, αpi, and the joint determination
of policy coefficients, αpi, νS and νB, which yields the highest welfare, respectively.
In the following, I will explain the modeling of each instrument in more detail.
For the conventional monetary policy, I consider implementable monetary pol-
icy rules. Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), these rules ensure the local
uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. This implies that the policy
coefficient on inflation, αpi, is limited in the interval [1.01, 3] in the context of my
model framework. The authors argue that policymakers would have difficulties in
communicating the policies associated with larger policy coefficients.
The proposed bank sector policy instrument in equation (4.38) is in the
vein of Gertler and Karadi (2011).11 The central bank intervenes in face of a
11The main difference between two specifications of the policy is the relevant financial variable
in the bank policy rule. I consider bank credit growth as a relevant indicator, whereas Gertler
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freeze/acceleration in bank lending. In the case of a bank credit crunch, the in-
tervention results in additional resources available to small firms relying on bank
credit in the form of τSt Q
S
t K
S
t . The amount of the intermediated loans through the
central bank are financed by government bonds.
For the bank credit policy, I search for the optimal value of νS in the interval
of (0,15). The chosen interval is orientated towards the specification by Gertler
and Karadi (2011). The authors suggest that the value of νS of 10 is a good repre-
sentation of the magnitude of intervention by the Federal Reserve in the financial
crisis of 2008. I do not want to take a stance on the exact number of the policy
responsiveness to deviations in the bank credit growth, but rather qualitatively
assign that higher values of the policy coefficient should be associated with a more
aggressive reaction of the central bank to credit imbalances.
The second credit policy instrument, τBt , aims at stabilizing the bond market
by directly affecting the bond premium:
EtR
B
k,t+1 = Et[ρ(ω¯
B
t+1)Rt] exp(τ
B
t ),
in the manner specified in equation (4.39). In the presence of changes in bond
issuance, the macroprudential instrument reacts to the growth of corporate bonds
by altering the finance premium on bonds. This macroprudential tool setup follows
Kannan et al. (2012) and Bailliu et al. (2015),12 who limit the policy coefficient
νB to the interval of [0, 1]. They argue that the value of this policy coefficient is
lower than the inflation coefficient since the prime goal of monetary policy is price
stability. Furthermore, I study one dimension of macroprudential policy frameworks
without specifying the implementation of the macroprudential tool. For example,
Quint and Rabanal (2014) suggest that bond premia can be increased by imposing,
e.g., additional capital surcharges, whereas the direct provision of liquidity to the
bond sector can decrease these premia.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Calibration
The time unit is one quarter. Most of the parameters are calibrated as in the model
by Gertler and Karadi (2011). The parameters related to the financial sector are
presented in table 4.1 and justified in the third chapter.
and Karadi (2011) use credit spread in their specification. The reason for a different target is
that stabilization effects from the policy related to credit volumes are larger in my framework.
12Note that Bailliu et al. (2015) specify the macroprudential tool that reacts to the deviations
of credit growth from its steady state value.
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Table 4.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Description Target
η 0.263 share of small firms Loans
Bonds
= 0.66
γS 0.957 survival probability of
banker
Leverage: 4
γB 0.979 survival probability of large
firms
Leverage: 2
λ 0.609 fraction of divertible bank
capital
258bp.(annualized)
µB 0.079 monitoring cost (mutual
funds)
BBB-spread:
209bp.(annualised)
F (ωB) 0.0134 default probability SG-debt: 5.37% (an-
nualized)
WB 0.005 transfer from households
Christiano et al.
(2014)
ωS 0.002 transfer from households
Gertler and Karadi
(2011)
ξj 1.72 curvature of investment ad-
justment cost
Gertler and Karadi
(2011)
ρ 0.6 substitutability of capital
Verona et al. (2013)
The sources of exogenous variations are non-financial (technology) shocks and
financial shocks. Each credit market segment features sector-specific shocks. In
particular, I consider an exogenous disturbance to the monitoring ability of mutual
funds and bankers’ incentive to divert assets. As explained above, the economy-wide
financial shock, is a combination of sectoral shocks.
Regarding the calibration of shock processes, I specify the standard deviation
of shocks so that the estimated output responses are exactly matched on impact
following aggregate supply and financial shocks as in the third chapter. The
persistence parameter is set so that the theoretical response of output falls within
the estimated credible set. The impulse response matching leads to the following
values of parameters: ρA = 0.70, ρG = 0.70, σA = 0.012 and σS, σB = 0.067. For
the combined financial shock, the standard deviation is chosen to replicate a rise in
both bank and bond premia, in addition to matching the response of output on
impact.13
13The calibrated shock generates a rise in finance premia, that corresponds to the lower bound
of the credible set of the estimated financial shock, documented in the chapter three. In order to
match the estimated empirical bond spread, I assume that the shock to monitoring costs is five
times stronger than the shock to the banking sector.
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4.3.2 Welfare implications of economy-wide shocks
Optimal policy rules
Table 4.2 presents policy coefficients under three different policy regimes specified
in section 4.2.1. It is important to emphasize that table 4.2 is only supposed to
yield a qualitative indication on the combination of policy instruments which is
associated with the highest welfare.
Table 4.2: Optimal policy rules
αpi νS νB Welfare Relative
cost gain
All shocks
Simple Taylor rule 1.5 - - −0.296 -
Optimized Taylor rule 3.0 - - −0.264 0.032
Optimized policy combination 3.0 3 0.2 −0.037 0.259
Technology shocks only
Simple Taylor rule 1.5 - - −0.070 -
Optimized Taylor rule 3.0 - - −0.051 0.019
Optimized policy combination 3.0 15 0.3 −0.007 0.063
Financial shocks only
Simple Taylor rule 1.5 - - −0.315 -
Optimized Taylor rule 3.0 - - −0.310 0.005
Optimized policy combination 3.0 3 0.2 −0.126 0.189
Notes: In the optimized Taylor rules, the policy parameters αpi are restricted to lie in the
interval [1.01, 3], respectively. For non-standard policy rules, I restricted policy parameters νS
and νB to the interval [0, 15] and [0, 1], respectively. All Taylor-type policy rules feature interest
rate smoothing with ρr = 0.8. The welfare cost g · 100 is expressed in terms of the steady state
consumption (see appendix C). A negative value for welfare costs indicates that households are
willing to give up a certain fraction of their steady state consumption in order to remain in
the deterministic economy relative to stochastic environment under certain policy regime. The
relative gain is calculated as the gain of a specific policy relative to the simple Taylor rule.
The central bank should try to achieve full inflation stabilization in each model
version, i.e., αpi = 3.0. The prescription for the optimal interest rate rule is the same
in scenarios with and without uncoventional policies, similar to the conclusions
from Cu´rdia and Woodford (2011). If additional policy measures are at the central
bank’s disposal, the central bank should make use of these policy tools.
In the following, I provide some intuition for reaction coefficients of non-standard
policy instruments. The use of policy measures has to be balanced against the
costs of this activity. Regarding the bank credit policy, costs associated with this
policy are rising in the amount of impaired bank loans. Hence, an aggressive
reaction of the policy maker in the case of financial shocks is inefficient. Instead
a moderate reaction of the central bank results in a sizable amount of loans to
small firms. In the case of technology shocks, it is beneficial to exercise the bank
policy instrument to the fullest extent, for these actions are not as costly as in the
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case of financial shocks. Relatively small declines in bank loans in these scenarios
(to be shown) are associated with lower costs of the bank credit policy. As for
the bond policy instrument, the policy maker uses this instrument with a similar
intensity in different shock scenarios. If both shocks are the economy’s driving forces,
optimal policy coefficients suggest that the stabilization of financial imbalances
under financial shock scenarios represents a dominating feature of the policy.
Table 4.2 also represents welfare costs14 and relative gains of optimized rules
compared to the simple Taylor rule.15 Welfare costs give a fraction of steady-state
consumption that households require as a compensation to live in the stochastic
economy under a certain policy regime. The relative gain denotes welfare gains of
a specific policy over the simple Taylor rule. The first finding is that, the simple
Taylor rule yields the highest welfare costs in every shock scenario, whereas the
optimal policy mix performs best. Choosing the inflation coefficient in the interest
rate policy rule optimally does not considerably improve the performance of a
simple Taylor rule. The result regarding the best performance of the optimal policy
combination should not come as a surprise, as the central bank can use three policy
instruments to achieve macroeconomic stabilization: Interest rate policy aims at
attaining inflation stabilization, whereas sectoral policy tool strives to stabilize
imbalances in the respective credit market. The second finding is that the largest
welfare gains of the optimal policy combination relative to the simple Taylor rule
occur in the models in which financial shocks hit the economy. My work confirms
the findings of Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010), among others, that the benefits of
unconventional policy measures are large under extraordinary circumstances, when
the process of financial intermediation is severely disrupted. On the other hand,
non-financial shocks, such as technology shocks, are associated with limited benefits
of the optimal policy mix, e.g., relative gain over the simple Taylor rule yields
0.063% of steady state consumption. Mechanisms at work are discussed below with
the help of impulse response functions following respective shocks.
The Ramsey policy
In the following, I compare the performance of three policy regimes against the
Ramsey optimal policy. Table 4.3 displays welfare losses of a particular policy
compared to the Ramsey policy.16 The Ramsey planer maximizes household utility
subject to the equilibrium conditions of the model economy setting one policy
instrument, the nominal interest rate. All three policy rules are inferior to the
14See appendix C for details on the calculation of welfare costs.
15I do not compare the performance of optimized rules relative to a standard Taylor rule with
inflation and output gap since the definition of an output gap is not unambiguous in the context
of a New Keynesian model with the endogenous capital accumulation (see, Woodford (2003),
Chapter 5).
16The Ramsey plan is implemented using Dynare, which runs the package ramsey policy.
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Ramsey policy. Households are willing to sacrifice between 0.133% and 0.292% of
their consumption stream to be as well off as under the Ramsey policy. Under the
optimal policy mix the welfare costs are reduced twice as much as under Taylor-type
rules. Hence, the suggested policy mix is closest to the Ramsey planner’s allocation.
Table 4.3: Welfare loss
αpi νS νB λc
Ramsey policy - - - -
Simple Taylor rule 1.5 - - 0.292
Optimized Taylor rule 3.0 - - 0.255
Optimized policy combination 3.0 3.0 0.2 0.133
Notes: Conditional welfare cost, λc · 100, is defined as a percentage decrease in
the Ramsey-optimal consumption process necessary to make the level of welfare
under the Ramsey policy identical to the one under the alternative policy (see
the details on the calculation of conditional welfare costs in Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe, 2007). The welfare under the Ramsey policy is calculated with the social
planner’s initial Lagrange multipliers set equal to their steady state values.
Impulse response functions: Economy-wide financial shocks
As shown in table 4.2, when economy-wide financial shocks are the only source of
an economy’s business cycle fluctuations, it is optimal for policy makers to use a
combination of policy tools. Figure 4.1 displays dynamic responses of main variables
to an adverse combined financial shock, causing a confidence loss in banks and
increased monitoring costs of mutual funds (by affecting λt and µt), respectively,
under the policies specified in section 4.2.1.
Following the negative financial shock, the functioning of the banking market
is more adversely impaired than that of the bond market, which is depicted in
a deep bank credit crunch and a substantial increase in bank premia. Due to
the increased incentive to divert assets, households do not ”trust” banks and
reduce deposits, which in turn reduces the ability of banks to lend by tightening
their capital constraints. The ensuing deleveraging process of banks induces a
recessionary period. In the bond sector, an unexpected increase in monitoring costs
of mutual funds raises bond premia, reduces bond volumes and, hence, investments
of large firms. As shown in the third chapter, under the simple Taylor rule, there
is a change in the corporate debt composition in favor of the less affected credit
market segment, the bond market, which dampens the effect of the shock on the
real economy.
If the central bank conducts only conventional monetary policy in the form
of the Taylor-type interest rate rule, it does not prevent a rise in finance premia
and a contraction in credit. For the conventional monetary policy cannot eliminate
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Figure 4.1: Adverse financial shock
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disruptions in credit market segments, it is associated with high welfare costs.17
To understand how the optimal policy combination works, I look closer at
developments in sectoral credit markets. The bank credit policy stabilizes the main
disruption in the financial system associated with the banking market. It helps
reduce the degree of financial friction that is intensified through the misbehavior of
banks. Namely, the central bank intermediates additional loans to small firms,18
which enable them to finance their capital purchases. As a consequence, the prices
of small firms’ capital are moderated, which in turn decreases the return on capital
and, therefore, the bank premium. A second effect of the policy is that bank balance
sheets improve due to the limited fall in the price of capital, which reduces tightness
of bank capital constraints and banks’ leverage ratio. Therefore, banks do not reduce
17I calculated welfare costs and analyzed the model dynamics for the scenarios without interest
rate smoothing. I find that the main model variables behave in a similar manner in the smoothing
and non-smoothing model versions.
18Initially, the central bank provides additional bank loans, however, as in the following periods
bank credit growth accelerates and bank balance sheets improve, the policy tries to dampen the
credit cycle. In particular, a negative bank policy instrument means that the central bank goes
short in bank loans.
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lending to small firms as much as in the case without the bank credit policy. The
direct effect of state intervention and the indirect effect on banks’ balance sheets
temper a decline in small firms’ investment and output (not shown). Similarly,
the bond macroprudential tool reacts to reduced bond issuance volumes, however,
it dampens a rise in bond premia negligibly.19 Nevertheless, the development in
the bond market is smoothed under the bond policy tool, which also moderates
capital prices in the bond sector and enhances investment spending of large firms.
Overall, due to smaller disruption in the bond market, the use of the bond policy
instrument improves only marginally the functioning of this market.
After understanding the economic mechanism behind the non-standard policy
instruments, I will provide intuition for their superior welfare performance. The
main contribution to economy’s stabilization comes from the use of the bank credit
policy. This policy alleviates a credit crunch and generates a powerful stimulus to
the economy in initial periods. I report a rise in the central bank’s balance sheet that
corresponds to the total value of 5% of small firms’ capital purchases. Hence, the
stimulus results in additional investment expenditures for bank finance-dependent
firms, which translates into an increase in labor demand and labor productivity
(on impact). Since wages are flexible, they will rise to establish an equilibrium
in the labor market after the shock hits the economy. As the substitution effect
dominates the income effect, households increase labor supply in the scenario with
the credit policy. Thus, the model also generates a wealth effect of labor supply
(an increase in consumption), which can be one of the reasons behind a better
performance of the policy mix relative to the standard Taylor rule. Note that there
is a certain degree of consumption smoothing under Taylor-type policies. In these
scenarios, a shortfall in the aggregate demand induces a fall in wages and labor
hours. Nevertheless, households can rely on the smooth consumption process since
they reduce the amount of deposits (e.g., as a result of mistrust in banks). The
credit policy restores trust in the banking system, moderating a decline in deposits.
In equilibrium, the wealth effect of labor supply dominates the positive effect from
the restored confidence in banks, and aggregate consumption increases under the
active bank credit policy.
The overall effect of bank and bond policy instruments is the stabilization of
respective credit markets, which in turn stabilize aggregate investment and aggregate
consumption. By shutting off the bank policy instrument in the counterfactual
exercise, the model predicts that the recovery does not feature an overshooting
19This instrument operates via balancing the growth in bond volumes. A negative value of
the policy instrument indicates that it subdues the bond premium. A positive value of the bond
policy instrument (following an improvement in bond issuance volumes) dampens the premium.
The value of the bond instrument is low as a result of small changes in bond volumes, which
results in hardly visible changes in the bond premium.
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effect in the labor market documented above,20 and welfare benefits are negligible
(not reported). Hence, the stabilization of the bond market via the macroprudential
instrument is not essential for welfare improvements. This result suggests that the
effective policy reaction needs to address the more disrupted credit market segment.
There is a consensus in the literature21 that the deviation of monetary policy
from the standard Taylor rule in form of an additional reaction to financial variables
or the use of unconventional policy tools is effective in mitigating adverse effects of
financial shocks on the real economy, if these disturbances impair the functioning
of financial markets to a large extent. My model featuring a segmented financial
market can replicate the results from the aforementioned literature established for
one single financial market.
Impulse response functions: Technology shocks
Figure 4.2 gives a visualization of the dynamics of main variables following a negative
technology shock under three policy rules, which are associated with quantitatively
similar welfare costs in table 4.2. As documented in the New Keynesian model,22
consumption falls and labor hours increase in the presence of a negative technology
shock. The nominal interest rate rises in response to an increase in inflation (as a
result of rising marginal costs), which leads to a rise in the real interest rate (since
the nominal interest rate moves more than one-to-one with inflation). On the firm
side, the adverse technology shock reduces the price of capital goods and, hence,
both sectors employ less capital in production (not reported), which induces a fall
in sectoral external financing and the total credit volume. Tightening of credit
conditions together with the lower value of net worth of banks and firms induces
an increase in respective leverage ratios and finance premia.
The qualitative behavior of the main variables is similar under three policy
regimes. Strong reaction to inflation deviations in the case of optimized rules (i.e.,
αpi = 3) increases relatively more the real interest rate, which in turn induces
larger changes in consumption than under the simple Taylor rule. Additionally, the
optimized Taylor rule is associated with relatively larger deviations of financial
premia and the credit volume from their steady states than the simple rule.23
However, it reduces inflation volatility, which is welfare-improving. The highest
20The result regarding the credit policy’s stimulus is in line with the model predictions from
the aggressive use of credit policy by Gertler and Karadi (2011).
21See, for example, Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010); Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gertler et al.
(2012), among others.
22See, for example, Gal´ı and Rabanal (2004); Smets and Wouters (2007).
23There is a substitution towards a cheaper form of capital (see figure C.1 in chapter C),
provided by the bond sector. Under the simple Taylor rule bond premia turn very low for mutual
funds, so that mutual funds are less willing to provide bond financing in comparison to the case
with optimized Taylor rule (associated with positive absolute deviation of bond premia from their
steady state). This explains differences in bond finance between two model economies using only
Taylor policy rule.
4.3. RESULTS 71
Figure 4.2: Adverse technology shock
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Note: Green lines refer to the dynamics of the model economy with two sector-specific
policy instruments; blue lines refer to the baseline model economy with the optimized
Taylor rule and red lines are associated with the simple Taylor rule. All the interest
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from the steady state, in percentage points. The remaining variables are reported in
percentage deviations from the steady state. Horizontal axis displays quarters after the
shock.
welfare is achieved by the policy mix, which appears to be, like in the case of
financial shocks, a result of stabilization of distortions in credit market segments.
Even though the technology shock generates a small propagation effect in the
financial market, it is optimal for the policy maker to moderate small imbalances
arising in credit market segments. Under the policy mix, bank premia are reduced
for a prolonged period of time in order to eliminate a main disruption in the
financial system, associated with the banking market. The state intervention
reduces the costs of bank finance, fostering capital purchases of small firms and,
hence, improving their investment prospects. As long as bank premia are lower
than bond premia, firms substitute towards a cheaper form of finance, bank finance
(see figure C.1 in appendix C).24 An additional stabilization effect of the policy mix
comes from the bond sector policy instrument. It is cyclical because it counteracts
movements in the corporate bond volume: An initial reduction of the bond premium
24Exactly the opposite mechanism happens under the (simple/optimized) Taylor rule, where
bank finance is more expensive than bond finance. The enhanced reduction of credit under Taylor
rules is the product of a rise in financial premia and a precipitous decline in bank loans.
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via the macroprudential tool tries to prompt additional lending activity in the
market, however, as the bond issuance volume rises in the following periods, the
policy instrument increases the bond premium. Despite the cyclicality of the bond
macroprudential instrument, it is associated with a smoother development in the
bond market, which contributes to credit market stabilization. Furthermore, it
affects positively capital goods prices of large firms, improving their investment
outcomes. Hence, the total effect of the two non-standard tools is seen in a reduced
decline of the total credit volume. The improvement of credit conditions, together
with strict inflation stabilization, achieves macroeconomic stabilization, as indicated
by welfare costs of 0.007% of steady state consumption in table 4.2.
My results suggest that the use of non-standard policy tools is beneficial in the
presence of technology shocks. The literature on this point is divided. For example,
Bailliu et al. (2015) show that in their model monetary and macroprudential policy
tools have conflicting interests, since the latter aims to stabilize nominal credit
growth and, therefore, counteracts the effects of monetary policy. Within the context
of my model, both bank and bond policy tool are related to changes in real volumes
of bank loans and bonds, respectively. Consequently, they do not conflict explicitly
with inflation targeting interest rate rules. On the other hand, Gambacorta and
Signoretti (2014) find that the Taylor rule responding to asset prices dampens the
propagation of positive technology shock by reducing the expansion of bank balance
sheets, their leverage and increasing lending rates. Though my optimized policy mix
does not directly respond to asset prices, it tries to attain credit market and inflation
stabilization, which in turn results in higher welfare. Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010)
also address a modified Taylor rule. They find that the rule reacting to the credit
spread can be beneficial in the presence of transitory technology shocks, whereas
the standard Taylor rule outperforms the augmented Taylor rule if technology
shocks are highly persistent.25 After accounting for highly persistent technology
shocks (i.e., ρA = 0.99 instead of ρA = 0.70) within my framework, I find that it is
still desirable for the central bank to use a combination of monetary, credit and
macroprudential policy instruments.
Even though the optimal policy prescribes the use of non-standard policy tools
in the presence of technology shocks, central bank lending programs to one credit
segment may not be seen as a feasible policy option if this is too costly or not
politically implementable. Especially, this argument may be relevant if shocks do
not originate directly in financial markets. Furthermore, the bank credit policy
alleviates the distortion associated with financial friction in the banking sector,
which induces a change in the corporate debt composition towards bank finance. As
already explained, this is beneficial within my framework, however, this may cause
25Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) show that the modified Taylor rule with credit spread is welfare
improving in case of financial shocks and non-financial demand shocks. However, the standard
Taylor rule suffices to stabilize the economy in the presence of preference or government shocks.
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inefficiencies and moral hazard issues, when financial intermediaries anticipate
state intervention and engage in more risk taking (see, e.g., Gertler et al., 2012).
In the light of these risks, the policy maker does not make a big mistake by only
conducting conventional monetary policy in response to technology shocks. My
findings indicate that welfare losses are limited under these policy scenarios.
4.3.3 Sectoral financial shocks
Welfare analysis
In this section I look at the scenarios associated with sector-specific financial
shocks, i.e., only one credit market is affected by a financial shock. Table 4.4
presents policy coefficients associated with the optimized and non-optimized
policies. I assume that the central bank chooses an optimal policy combination
according to equations (4.37), (4.38) and (4.39), knowing exactly the type of shock.
Non-optimized policies refer to policy mixes that are not optimal from the point
of view of an economy which is only hit by the considered sectoral shock. They
are optimal, however, in economies featuring the other type of sectoral shock or
combined financial shocks. The relative gain (1) denotes welfare gains of a specific
policy over the simple Taylor rule, whereas the relative gain (2) denotes welfare
gains of a policy relative to the policy mix, found for the economy hit only by
combined financial shocks.
In the case of bank sector shocks,26 a welfare-maximizing policy combination
implies a deviation from strict inflation stabilization (αpi = 1.4), moderate reaction
of the bank credit policy (νS = 3) and no use of the bond macroprudential tool
(νB = 0). Welfare results suggest that the size of the inflation coefficient plays a
minor role (c.f., the relative gains (2) of the non-optimized policies with αpi = 3 and
the optimal policy mix with αpi = 1.4). The optimal policy mix does not feature
a bond instrument for following reasons: The unaffected bond market segment
features an increase in bond issuance. This has a stabilizing effect on the economy,
which contributes to the reduced welfare cost. Hence, inducing a decelerating
process of bond issuance, via the bond macroprudential tool, is counterproductive.
26The size of the bank sector shock is calibrated so that the response of output on impact
matched the empirical counterpart, estimated in the third chapter. This results in higher standard
deviation (i.e., σS = 0.10) than the one associated with the combined financial shock.
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Table 4.4: Optimal policy rules following sectoral shocks
αpi νS νB Welfare Relative Relative
cost gain(1) gain(2)
Bank sector shocks only
Optimal policy
Policy mix 1.4 3 0 0.270 0.424 0.007
Non-optimized policy
Simple Taylor rule 1.5 - - −0.154 - −0.417
Policy conditional on combined fin.shocks 3.0 3 0.1 0.263 0.417 -
Policy conditional on bond sector shocks 3 4.5 1 0.257 0.411 −0.006
Bond sector shocks only
Optimal policy
Policy mix 3 4.5 1 −1.033 0.029 0.005
Non-optimized policy
Simple Taylor rule 1.5 - - −1.062 - −0.024
Policy conditional on combined fin.shocks 3.0 3 0.1 −1.038 0.024 -
Policy conditional on bank sector shocks 1.4 3 0 −1.064 −0.002 −0.027
Notes: Optimal policy mix refers to the policy combination that is welfare-maximizing in economies with respective sectoral shocks. Non-optimized policies include the simple Taylor rule
and policy mixes that the central bank would choose assuming incorrectly the type of shock - combined financial shocks or shocks originating from the non-affected sector. Welfare costs are
calculated in the same way as in table 4.2. The relative gain(1) is calculated as the gain of a specific policy relative to the simple Taylor rule, i.e., a difference in welfare costs of the specific
policy relative to the simple Taylor rule. The relative gain(2) is calculated as the gain of a specific policy relative to the policy mix, which is the optimal combination of interest rate rule
and credit policy instruments in the economy hit by combined financial shock.
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Now, I turn to the welfare implications of different policies conditional on bank
sector shocks. How large are the mistakes that the central bank commits if she
incorrectly identifies the source of the sectoral financial shock? The mistakes are
small, if she assumes that economy-wide financial shocks hit the economy and
adopts a policy mix that is optimal in the presence of these shocks. Relative gains
of the optimal policy response to bank sector shocks over the policy mix (chosen
for the case of economy-wide shocks) are 0.007% of steady state consumption.
Similarly, if the central bank assumes that shocks originate in the bond sector
and uses a policy mix that is optimal in the economy featuring only bond sector
shocks, welfare losses are limited.27 Hence, how important is it that the central
bank conducts optimal policy? It is not important, in the context of bank sector
shocks, as long as the policy is an optimal response to shocks originating in the
bond sector or in both sectors. These results are positive news for policy makers,
as they suggest that the policy response does not need to be tailored to shocks
emanating in a specific credit market segment. It contradicts a well-known result
by Cu´rdia and Woodford (2011), who find that the use of optimal policy depends
on the nature of the financial disturbance.
How large are mistakes if the central bank does not respond to credit market
conditions and conducts conventional monetary policy in the presence of bank
sector shocks? The simple Taylor rule results in large welfare costs, equivalent
to -0.154% of steady state consumption. On the other hand, the model suggests
that households gain from living in the stochastic economy with sectoral bank
shocks under policy rules that feature the bank credit policy (e.g., 0.270% of steady
state consumption in the case of the optimal policy mix). The economic rationale
for the result is the following: Households anticipate that the state intervention
will restore trust in the banking sector by providing additional loans (capital) to
absorb effects of these shocks. Therefore, the presence of the bank credit policy
insures households against risks of the fall in asset prices and depletion of deposits,
eliminating their need for precautionary savings. The additional amount of capital
and deposits in these scenarios reduce risk perceptions, yielding an increase in the
mean consumption in the second order stochastic steady state (which is established
using a non-linear moving average toolkit by Lan and Meyer-Gohde, 2013). Hence,
the stochastic economy under unconventional policy regimes is preferred over the
environment with no credit policy intervention.
Now, I will turn to the discussion of bond sector shocks. The optimal policy
response implies that the central bank pursues strict inflation stabilization28 (αpi =
27The relative gain of the optimal policy mix over the policy mix chosen for economies affected
by bond sector shocks is 0.013%, c.f., 0.007%-(-0.006%) = 0.013%. To compute this result, I used
two results from relative gains (2) in table 4.4: the relative gain of the optimal policy and the
sectoral policy over the policy conditional on economy wide shocks, respectively.
28The results suggest that bond sector shocks have inflationary tendencies and, therefore, it is
desirable to react strongly to inflation deviations. In the case of bank sector shocks, the opposite
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3), uses moderate bank credit policy (νS = 4.5), and reacts strongly to imbalances
in the bond sector (νB = 1). Strict inflation stabilization aims at neutralizing
inflationary pressures, whereas the purpose of bank credit policy is to dampen the
financial boom in bank loans. The aggressive policy reaction to bond imbalances
attempts to address the most disrupted credit market segment and eliminate
distortions caused by financial frictions in this sector.
In the following, I will assess welfare implications of policy rules conditional on
bond sector shocks. Are central bank’s mistakes large if she acts on the assumption
that shocks originate in both sectors? The model predicts small relative gains of
the optimal policy combination over the policies associated with economy-wide
shocks, e.g., 0.005 % of steady state consumption. How important is it that the
central bank’s policy responds to credit market conditions? The answer is that
it is not important within the context of bond sector shocks, because all policy
rules have a comparable welfare performance. For example, the relative gain of the
optimal policy over the simple Taylor rule is 0.029% of steady state consumption.
This result suggests that the optimal policy is ineffective in neutralizing the credit
market distortions caused by bond sector shocks. To gain a better understanding of
the effects of different policies, I will now turn to the analysis of impulse response
functions.
Impulse response analysis
Bank sector shocks: Figure 4.3 presents the responses for an adverse shock to λt,
causing a loss of confidence in the banking sector. I focus on the model dynamics
under the simple Taylor rule, the optimal policy mix and the policy combination,
that is chosen optimally by the central bank assuming that financial shocks
originate in both sectors.
As the propagation of bank sector shocks resembles the model economy
dynamics following economy-wide shocks (in terms of large disruptions in bank
lending and a substantial rise in bank premia), the optimized policy in the economy
affected by the latter shocks performs well also in the economy with bank sector
shocks. The main difference concerns an increase in bond issuance, which intensifies
the change in the debt composition in favor of corporate bonds. The substitution
towards bond finance, as indicated by a fall in the bank loans’ share in figure 4.3,
happens because bond premia are lower than bank premia. Higher demand for
capital of large firms increases the price of capital of these firms and investment
in the bond sector. Under the simple Taylor rule, the change in the corporate
debt composition is not sufficient to eliminate the negative effects of the shock, as
declines in labor hours and consumption indicate. By actively preventing a bank
is true. As a result of deflationary tendencies, it is optimal to react less aggressively to inflation
deviations.
4.3. RESULTS 77
Figure 4.3: Adverse bank sector specific shock
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Note: Blue lines refer to the dynamics of model economy with optimal policy mix
conditional on bank-sector shocks. Green line refers to model dynamics where the
policy maker use a policy mix, which is welfare-maximizing in the economy hit by
combined financial shocks. Red line represents the dynamics under the simple Taylor
rule. All the interest rates, premia, bank and bond policy instruments are reported
in absolute deviations from the steady state, in percentage points. The remaining
variables are reported in percentage deviations from the steady state. Horizontal axes
display quarters after the shock.
credit crunch, state intervention depresses bank premia, provides additional credit
to small firms and stabilizes the severely disrupted bank market. The economic
mechanism is described in section 4.3.2.
Bond sector shocks: A contractionary bond sector shock, which increases monitoring
costs, rises bond premia and reduces the amount of corporate bonds as well as total
credit, as depicted in figure 4.4. Since the banking sector is not affected, there is a
substitution towards capital of small firms and bank finance, i.e., an increase in
the bank loans’ share. As a consequence, this sector features an investment boom,
whereby enhanced capital demand drives up capital prices of small firms, reducing
bank premia. Even though the banking market manages to absorb partly negative
effects of bond-sector shocks, it cannot offset the disruption in the bond market.
The reason is that a large portion of firms relies only on bond finance; the financing
and investment prospects of these firms remain dismal in the aftermath of the
shock. This causes a decline in aggregate investment and real activity.
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Figure 4.4: Adverse bond sector shock
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Note: Blue lines refer to the dynamics of model economy with optimal policy mix
conditional on bank-sector shocks. Green line refers to model dynamics where the
policy maker use a policy mix, which is welfare-maximizing in the economy hit by
combined financial shocks. Red line represents the dynamics under the simple Taylor
rule. All the interest rates, premia, bank and bond policy instruments are reported
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variables are reported in percentage deviations from the steady state. Horizontal axes
display quarters after the shock.
It is interesting to note that bank credit policy tries to counteract a boom in
bank lending activity. A negative bank policy instrument indicates that the central
bank goes short in intermediating loans. Trying to restrict the bank credit supply,29
the credit policy induces an increase in bank premia. In my framework, banks
benefit from the policy as they earn higher profits from increased premia. They
face relaxed leverage constraints as a result of high net worth and the enhanced
value of their assets. Therefore, they are willing to intermediate more loans, as
presented in figure 4.4.
As indicated by table 4.4, there are quantitatively small differences between
the policy mixes and the simple Taylor rule. The optimal use of unconventional
policies leads to smoother consumption and labor responses than in the absence
of these policies. The bond policy instrument is exercised to the fullest extent,
νB = 1, however, the resulting depression of bond premia is quantitatively small,
i.e., a reduction in the bond premium by one percentage point (on annual basis).
29This can be achieved via an additional bank regulation, such as capital surcharges in Basel
III (see, e.g., Repullo and Suarez, 2013; Passmore and von Hafften, 2017).
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This exerts small effects on the price of investment goods of large firms. As a
consequence, bond volumes change little and additional investment expenditures
are negligible. These results suggest that there are financial shocks, such as bond
sector shocks, where the optimal policy rule cannot eliminate disruptions in the
financial system.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes a combination of interest rate rules and non-standard policy
instruments in the context of a medium-scale financial DSGE model with a banking
and a bond market segment. If business cycles are driven by financial shocks, which
cause severe disruptions in the functioning of both credit market segments, the
central bank should use a bank credit policy and a bond macroprudential tool,
together with a nominal interest rate, to achieve macroeconomic stabilization. The
benefits of these non-standard policy instruments are reduced if shocks have the
non-financial nature.
In the context of shocks affecting only the bank sector, my results are promising
as they indicate that the policy maker does not make a big mistake if she fails
to identify this shock correctly, as long as she acts on the assumption that the
shock belongs to the class of financial shocks. The welfare losses are negligible if
her policy response is optimally chosen assuming that the economy was buffeted
by economy-wide shocks or shocks originating in the bond market.
Conditional on shocks originating in the bond sector, welfare implications
of optimal and non-optimal policies are comparable. Within the context of my
model, these shocks cause a rise in bond premia, that cannot be accommodated
by policy. Hence, the result indicates that some types of financial shocks amplify
the distortions, resulting from financial frictions, to such a degree, that an optimal
policy response brings minor benefits.
It should be stressed that I assumed that the central bank has the authority to
implement all policy instruments. In case of separate monetary and macroprudential
authority, one would need to consider the (non-)coordination of two authorities.30
Using a richer credit market framework, it would be interesting to see if the interests
of these authorities are conflicting in the presence of aggregate and sectoral shocks.
30See, c.f., Gelain and Ilbas (2017); Carrillo et al. (2017).
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the external finance premium
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A.1. SVAR WITH SIGN RESTRICTIONS 81
A.1 SVAR with sign restrictions
Following Uhlig (2005) and Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010), I consider a VAR model
xt = A+B(1)xt−1 +B(2)xt−2 + . . .+B(M)xt−M + ut,
where xt is a N × 1 vector containing N endogenous variables, A is N × 1 vector
of constants, B(i) for i = 1, ..M represents N × N coefficient matrices and ut is
N × 1 one-step ahead prediction error with a variance-covariance matrix, Σ, of size
N ×N .
The prediction error is related linearly to the structural shocks:
ut = Sεt,
whereby S is a non-singular parameter matrix and εt ∼ N(0, IN). A Bayesian
estimation is undertaken to obtain the reduced-form VAR.1 Following Uhlig (2005),
both prior and posterior for (B(i), Σ) come from the Normal-Wishart distribution.
He shows how the posterior can be analytically obtained.
The procedure can be described as follows. In the first step, the Cholesky
identification is used to retrieve the matrix S. In the next step, I use the candidate
identifications yielding the identity variance covariance matrix. There exists a
nonsingular matrix Q, such that the new impact matrix S∗ = SQ and corresponding
structural shocks ε∗t = Q
−1εt, whereby reduced-form residuals ut = S∗ε∗t . Assuming
that Q is an orthogonal matrix, i.e., Q−1 = Q′, the newly generated structural
shocks have an identity variance covariance matrix:
E[ε∗t ε
∗
t ] = E[Q
−1εtQε′t] = Q
−1QE[εtε′t] = IN .
Therefore, the candidate structural representations related to each S∗ result in
different impulse responses:
xt = C(L)S
∗ε∗t .
If the matrices Ci from the reduced-form moving average in equation (A.1) are
stacked, the response vector up to the first horizon (on impact) is given by
R(1) = E[S ′ S ′C ′1]
′Q.
The sign restrictions related to the specific impulse responses are imposed on the
column vectors of the above matrix. The algorithm used to set the sign restrictions
is described in Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010). The functioning of the algorithm can
be summarized as follows. I draw a Z matrix such that Z ∼ N(0, IN). Afterwards
1Akaike information criterion is used to determine the number of lags.
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I undertake a QR decomposition of Z. This decomposition enables me to get the
orthogonal matrix Q. In the next step, candidate impulse responses are obtained
from SQ and B(i) for i = 1, ..M . It is checked whether these generated impulse
responses satisfy the sign restrictions. If the sign restrictions are not satisfied, a
new Z is drawn and an iteration over the same procedure takes place until the sign
restrictions are satisfied. The procedure is repeated so many times as necessary
as it is to keep 1000 draws that satisfy sign restrictions. The obtained impulse
responses are used to compute the statistics as well as to generate the credible sets.
A.1.1 Data and sources
Figure A.1 depicts the measure of the EFP, the GZ credit spread. The spread is
constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) using individual unsecured corporate
bond yields of nonfinancial firms.
Data overview:
Figure A.1: Corporate credit spread: GZ credit spread
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Notes: The shaded vertical areas represent the NBER-dated recessions. Sample period:
1973Q1-2010Q3. Source:
Real GDP: GDP (seasonally adjusted), divided by GDP deflator. Source: FRED.
GDP deflator Source: FRED.
Nominal short-term interest rate: effective federal funds (FF) rate (secondary
market rate), expressed in annual units and in percentage points. Source: FRED.
Credit: sum of corporate bonds, bank loans and other loans and advances (non-
financial corporate business) Source: FRED.
GZ credit spread: average credit spread on senior unsecured bonds issued by nonfi-
nancial firms, expressed in annual units and in percentage points. Source: Gilchrist
and Zakrajˇsek (2012).
Stock prices: stock market index, divided by GDP deflator. Source: FRED.
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BAA-AAA spread: Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield -Moody’s Sea-
soned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield, expressed in annual units and in percentage
points. Source: FRED.
BAA-10 Tr spread: Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield (BAA corporate
credit index) - 10 year Treasury constant maturity rate, expressed in annual units
and in percentage points. Source: FRED.
EBP (excess bond premium): a component of GZ credit spread. Source: Gilchrist
and Zakrajˇsek (2012).
A.2 Overview of theoretical impulse responses
The following tables represent an overview of initial reactions of respective variables
following a shock. The reported signs in tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, A.1 , A.2 and A.3 related
to the responses of respective variables are based on my calculations and results
documented in the respective studies. Note that some model codes come from the
macroeconomic database by Wieland et al. (2012) and are further extended by
myself. All the models except for Gertler and Karadi (2011), Brzoza-Brzezina et al.
(2013), Meh and Moran (2010), Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) are estimated. All
the shocks represent adverse disturbances. Note that the choice of models differs in
the tables because not every financial NK model considers the shock or variable of
interest.
Table A.1: Sign restrictions on the price of capital
Supply Demand Monetary Financial
Carlstrom et al. (2014) NA NA - -
Christensen and Dib (2008) - + - NA
Christiano et al. (2010) -/+ NA - -
DeGraeve (2008) - - - NA
Gerali et al. (2010) - -/+ - -
Gertler and Karadi (2011) - NA - -
Meh and Moran (2010) - NA - -
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) - NA - -
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) + NA - -
Notes: A “+” indicates that the impact response is positive; a “-” indicates that the
impact response is negative; a “0” indicates a zero-response of the variable on impact;
“NA” indicates that the model does not consider a specific shock, “+/-” indicates
that the impact response can be either positive or negative depending on the type of shock.
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Table A.2: Sign restrictions on credit
Supply Demand Monetary Financial
Carlstrom et al. (2014) NA NA - -
Christensen and Dib (2008) - + - NA
Christiano et al. (2010) 0 NA - 0
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) - +/- - -
DeGraeve (2008) - + - NA
Gerali et al. (2010) - - - -
Gertler and Karadi (2011) - NA - -
Meh and Moran (2010) - NA - -
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) - NA 0 -
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) 0 NA - -
Notes: A “+” indicates that the impact response is positive; a “-” indicates that
the impact response is negative; a “0” indicates a zero-response of the variable on
impact; “NA” indicates that the model does not consider a specific shock, “+/-” indicates
that the impact response can be either positive or negative depending on the type of shock.
Table A.3: Sign restrictions EFP (extended)
Supply Demand Monetary Financial
Carlstrom et al. (2014) NA NA - +
Christensen and Dib (2008) - - + NA
Christiano et al. (2010) −/+∗ NA + +
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) - +/- -/0 +
DeGraeve (2008) + - + NA
Gerali et al. (2010) + - - +
Gertler and Karadi (2011) + NA + +
Meh and Moran (2010) - NA + +
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) - NA + +
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) 0 NA 0 +
Notes: A “+” indicates that a rise in the EFP on impact, i.e., it is countercyclical; a “-”
indicates a fall in the EFP on impact, i.e., it is procyclical; a “0” indicates a zero-response
of the EFP on impact; “NA” indicates that the model does not consider a specific shock.
∗Christiano et al. (2010) report that the premium increases in the model without the
Fisher effect.
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A.3 Robustness checks
The extended model
Figures A.2, A.3,A.4 and A.5 plot dynamic consequences of endogenous variables
following identified supply shocks, demand shocks, monetary policy socks and
financial shocks, respectively. Structural shocks are identified using the extended
model specified in table 2.5. This identification scheme tries to differentiate between
financial and demand shocks in a theory-consistent manner. Structural demand
shocks correspond to preference shocks in DSGE models.
The main results regarding the EFP continue to hold. The premium is counter-
cyclical over the short term conditional on the supply shock and the monetary policy
shock. It is worth emphasizing that estimated response of the EFP is statistically
signification conditional on the latter shock (see figure A.4).
Median impulse response functions of endogenous variables are similar to the
ones estimated using the baseline identification approach. By focusing on unre-
stricted variables, following findings based on median responses can be summarized:
Credit and stock prices fall in response to structural supply shocks, which is in
line with predictions from DSGE models presented in table A.1 and A.2. Both
variables increase following demand shocks, which is consistent with predictions of
preference shocks. Following monetary policy shocks, stock prices fall, confirming
the conventional wisdom. Namely, all financial frictions models predict a fall in
the price of capital, in table A.1. It is also predicted that, conditional on the
monetary policy shock, credit declines after a lag, which is consistent with the
theory presented in table A.2. With respect to financial shocks, inflation increase,
making a case for inflationary nature of financial shocks, which arises in the DSGE
model with collateral constraints by Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013).
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Figure A.2: Extended model: Adverse supply shock
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Notes: The bold red lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are estimated from
a Bayesian VAR with 1000 draws. The bounds are the 16th and 84th percentiles. The impulse
responses are related to an adverse one standard deviation aggregate supply shock using
identification scheme in table 2.5. GDP, GDP deflator, credit and stock prices are expressed in
percentage deviations, whereas the EFP and nominal interest rate are reported in percentage
points. The horizontal axis is in quarters. The time period is 1973Q1-2010Q3.
Figure A.3: Extended model: Adverse demand shock
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Notes: See notes in figure A.2.
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Figure A.4: Extended model: Adverse monetary policy shock
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Notes: The bold red lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are estimated from
a Bayesian VAR with 1000 draws. The bounds are the 16th and 84th percentiles. The impulse
responses are related to an adverse one standard deviation aggregate supply shock using
identification scheme in table 2.5. GDP, GDP deflator, credit and stock prices are expressed in
percentage deviations, whereas the EFP and nominal interest rate are reported in percentage
points. The horizontal axis is in quarters. The time period is 1973Q1-2010Q3.
Figure A.5: Extended model: Adverse financial shock
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Notes: See notes in figure A.4.
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A.3.1 Excluding the Great Recession and the pre-Volcker
era
Figure A.6: Robustness check: Adverse monetary policy shock
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Notes: The bold lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are estimated from a
Bayesian VAR with 1000 draws. The bounds are the 16th and 84th percentiles. The impulse
responses are related to an adverse one standard deviation financial shock using identification
scheme in table 2.1. GDP, GDP deflator, credit and stock prices are expressed in percentage
deviations, whereas the EFP and nominal interest rate are reported in percentage points. The
horizontal axis is in quarters. The time period is 1979Q3-2007Q3.
Figure A.7: Robustness check: Adverse financial shock
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B.1 Empirical evidence on the corporate debt
composition
B.1.1 Debt financing
Figure B.1 illustrates how bank loans and corporate bonds changed from 1990 to
2011. It shows that recessions are associated with increases in bond issues and
declines in bank loans. In the following, I use an SVAR model with sign restrictions
to study the conditional dynamics of the corporate debt composition, investment
and finance premia.
Figure B.1: Debt financing
Source: Adrian et al. (2012)
B.1.2 Data and sources
Real GDP: GDP (seasonally adjusted), divided by GDP deflator. Source: FRED.
Investment: Business equipment (seasonally adjusted), divided by GDP deflator.
Source: FRED.
GDP deflator Source: FRED.
Nominal short-term interest rate: effective federal funds (FF) rate (secondary
market rate), expressed in annual units and in percent. Source: FRED.
Credit: sum of corporate bonds, bank loans and other loans and advances
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(non-financial corporate business) Source: FRED.
Debt composition (bank loans share): ratio of bank loans to corporate bonds.
Source: FRED.
CP-spread: commercial paper rate - FF rate, expressed in annual units and in
percent. Source: FRED.
BP-spread: bank prime rate - FF rate, expressed in annual units and in percent.
Source: FRED.
B.1.3 SVAR model
Table B.1 summarizes the set of sign restrictions based on major financial New
Keynesian models, which corresponds to the extended model in the second chapter.
For the purposes of this chapter, I focus on the key variables of interest - the
corporate debt composition (the bank loan’s share), investment and premia for
bank and non-bank finance. It should be noted that the former two variables are
left unrestricted. The estimated model results are reported in the section B.3.
Table B.1: Identification of the SVAR model
Supply Demand Financial
Real GDP - - -
Investment NA NA NA
GDP deflator + - NA
Nominal interest rate + - -
Credit NA NA -
Debt composition NA NA NA
EFP NA - +
Notes: A “+” indicates that the impact response is positive; a “-” indicates that the impact
response is negative; “NA” a impulse response can be either positive or negative. EFP denotes
external finance premium. All the shocks represent adverse disturbances.
B.2 Equilibrium conditions
Households
λt = Et {βRtλt+1} (B.1)
wt =
ψL L
φL
t
λt
(B.2)
λt =
1
(Ct − hCt−1) −
βh
(EtCt+1 − hCt) (B.3)
Λt,t+1 =
λt+1
λt
(B.4)
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Intermediate goods producers
Y mt = At(Kt)
αL1−αt ∆t (B.5)
Kt−1 =
[
η(KSt )
ρ + (1− η)(KBt )ρ
] 1
ρ (B.6)
rjk,t =
[
αAtst
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α (
Kjt
)ρ−1
K
1
ρ
−1
t
] 1
α
(B.7)
rk,Bt
rk,St
=
(
KBt
KSt
)ρ−1
(B.8)
wt = st
αY mt
Lt
(B.9)
Y It = Yt∆t (B.10)
Π∗t =

− 1
Fmt
Zmt
Πt, (B.11)
Fmt = Y
m
t st + βθEtΛt,t+1Π

t+1Π
−ι
t F
m
t+1 (B.12)
Zmt = Y
m
t + βθEtΛt,t+1Π
−1
t+1Π
−ι(−1)
t Z
m
t+1 (B.13)
∆t = θ∆t−1ΠtΠ
−ι
t−1 + (1− θ)
−1
−1
(
1− θΠ−1t Π−θ(−1)t−1
) 
−1
(B.14)
Capital good producers
Qjt =
1− βEt
{
Λt,t+1f
′
(
Ijt+1
Ijt
)
Ijt+1
2
Ijt
2
}
1− f
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
− f ′
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
Ijt
Ijt−1
(B.15)
Kjt =
{
(1− δ)Kjt−1 +
(
1− f
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
))
Ijt
}
(B.16)
Banks and small firms:
νt = Et
{
(1− γS)βΛt,t+1(RSk,t+1 −Rt) + βΛt,t+1γSχt,t+1νt+1
}
(B.17)
ηt = Et
{
(1− γS) + βΛt,t+1γSzt,t+1ηt+1
}
(B.18)
zt−1,t = (RSk,t −Rt−1)(φSt−1) + Rt−1 (B.19)
χt−1,t =
(
φSt
φSt−1
)
zt−1,t (B.20)
QSt K
S
t = Nt +Dt (B.21)
φSt ≡
QSt K
S
t
NSt
=
ηt
(λSt − νt)
(B.22)
NSt = γ
S[(RSk,t −Rt−1)φSt−1 +Rt]NSt−1 + ωSQSt KSt−1 (B.23)
RSk,t+1 =
rSk,t+1 + (1− δ)QSt+1
QSt
(B.24)
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Mutual funds and large firms
BBt = Q
B
t K
B
t −NBt (B.25)
EtR
B
k,t+1 = Et[ρ(ω¯
B
t+1)Rt] (B.26)
ρ(ω¯Bt+1) =
Γ′t(ω¯
B
t+1)
[(Γt(ω¯Bt+1)− µt+1Gt(ω¯Bt+1))Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1) + (1− Γt(ω¯Bt+1))(Γ′t(ω¯Bt+1)− µt+1G′t(ω¯Bt+1))]
(B.27)
Γt(ω¯
B
t+1) = (1− Ft(ω¯Bt+1)ω¯Bt+1 +
∫ ω¯Bt+1
0
ωdFt(ω
B) (B.28)
Ft = Φ
(
ln(ωBt ) +
σω,t
2
σω,t
)
(B.29)
ft =
1√
2piωBt σω,t
exp
−1
2
(
ln(ωBt ) + σ
2
ω,t
σω,t
)2 (B.30)
Γt = Φ
[(
ln(ωBt ) + σω,t
2
σ2ω,t
)
− σω,t
]
+ ωBt
{
1− Φ
[(
ln(ωBt ) + σω,t
2
σω,t
)]}
(B.31)
Gt = Φ
[(
ln(ωBt ) + σ
2
ω,t
σω,t
)
− σω,t
]
(B.32)
F ′t = 1− Ft (B.33)
G′t = ω
B
t
1√
2piωBt σω,t
exp
[
−1
2
(
ln(ωBt ) + σ
2
ω,t
σω,t
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(B.34)
ω¯t+1 =
Zt
(
QBt K
B
t −NBt
)
RBk,t+1Q
B
t K
B
t
(B.35)
NBt = γ
B(1− Γt−1(ω¯t))RBk,tQBt−1KBt−1 +WB (B.36)
φBt ≡
QBt B
B
t
NBt
(B.37)
Market clearing and some definitions
Yt = Ct + It (B.38)
It = ηI
S
t + (1− η)IBt (B.39)∫ ∞
0
KSi,tdi = K
S,a
t = ηK
S
t , (B.40)∫ ∞
0
KSi,tdi = K
B,a
t = (1− η)KBt , (B.41)
Btott = (1− η)(QBt KBt −NBt ) + ηQSt BSt , (B.42)
Υt =
ηQSt B
S
t
(1− η)(QBt KBt −NBt )
. (B.43)
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Shock processes
lnAt = ρa lnAt−1 + et,A, (B.44)
lnλSt = (1− ρG) lnλS + ρG lnλSt−1 + et,S, (B.45)
µt =
1
1 + eΞt
(B.46)
ln Ξt = (1− ρG) ln Ξ + ρG ln Ξt−1 + et,B, (B.47)
Monetary policy
Rnt
Rn
=
(
Rnt−1
Rn
)ρr ((Πt
Π
)αpi)1−ρr
, (B.48)
Rt =
Rnt
EtΠt+1
. (B.49)
B.3 Impulse response functions: SVAR and
DSGE model
Figures B.2 and B.3 depict the estimated median impulses responses together with
the respective credible sets. The median impulse responses are estimated from a
Bayesian VAR with 1000 draws. The bounds are the 16th and 84th percentiles.
To compare the theoretical and empirical impulse responses, I chose the size of
financial shock so that the output response on impact is matched. Figure B.2 shows
that the theoretical model does pretty well in matching the persistence and shape
of empirical impulse responses. Most of the impulse responses fall into 68% percent
posterior probability regions of the estimated impulse responses.
The negative reaction of investment is more cyclical in the model than in
the data. The impulse response of the bank loans’ share reacts stronger than the
empirical counterpart throughout the period considered. It should be emphasized
that the bank loan share was unrestricted in the SVAR. These key results suggest
that the predictions from my benchmark model are in line with the empirical effects
of the financial shock.
Interestingly, similar to the SVAR evidence, the DSGE model predicts a fast
recovery of the banking sector. The reason is that banks can rather quickly restore
their profitability by charging high loan premia. As a consequence, banks stabilize
their balance sheet positions and start extending loans to firms. Once the banks
are capitalized, they intermediate loans that the small firm sector uses for financing
capital purchases.
The dynamic consequences of estimated financial shock are in line with predic-
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Figure B.2: Adverse financial shock
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Blue lines refer to the impulse responses generated by the benchmark theoretical model following the combined
financial shock. Magenta lines refer to the estimated financial shock (bank spread shock) from the SVAR model.
The identification is specified in table B.1. The error bands represent 16% and 84% percentile of posterior distri-
bution. The time period is 1980Q1-2014Q2. Finance premia, nominal interest rate and the bank loan’s share are
reported in absolute deviations, the remaining variables are expressed in percentage deviations. The horizontal
axis displays quarters after shock.
tions of DSGE models, for example, Gertler and Karadi (2011), Bernanke et al.
(1999), Christiano et al. (2010) to name a few. The novel feature of the model refers
to the dynamics of the corporate debt composition. The decline in the ratio of bank
loans to corporate bonds is statistically significant. Two measures of finance premia
for the short-term bank and non-bank corporate debt are statistically significant
as well. The spread on the bank loans seem to increase substantially more than the
spread on non-bank debt. For completeness, I also include the estimated impulse
responses to the aggregate demand shock.
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Figure B.3: Adverse supply shock
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Black lines refer to the impulse responses generated by the benchmark theoretical model following the technology
shock. Magenta lines refer to the estimated aggregate supply shock from the SVAR model. The identification
is specified in table B.1. The error bands represent 16% and 84% percentile of posterior distribution. The time
period is 1980Q1-2014Q2. Finance premia, nominal interest rate and the bank loan’s share are reported in absolute
deviations, the remaining variables are expressed in percentage deviations. The horizontal axis displays quarters
after shock.
Figure B.4: Adverse demand shock
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Notes: See notes in figure B.3.
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B.4 Extended impulse response analysis
B.4.1 Technology shocks
Figure B.5 depicts the responses of some key variables in the model following a
negative technology shock in the benchmark economy. A decrease in aggregate
TFP leads to a strong and persistent decrease in investment. Note that the
propagation of a technology shock with respect to investment matches well the
empirical evidence on the supply shock (c.f., figure B.3).
Figure B.5: Adverse technology shock
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Note: Blue dashed lines refer to the variables associated with the banking sector, whereas the red
circled lines refer to the bond sector. Black lines refer to the aggregates. Finance premia and the
bank loan’s share are reported in absolute deviations, the remaining variables are expressed in
percentage deviations.
The technology shock has negligible effects on the financial variables (small
changes in premia and debt composition). Initially, bank loans do not change as
much as bonds which results in an increase in the loan-to-bond financing ratio.
However, the banking sector is affected more by the shock since it is more leveraged.
Declines in asset prices reduce the value of the bank’s net worth which makes bank
finance premia rise and lead to a further tightening of loan supply.
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B.4.2 Preference shocks
One possible theoretical model extension is to consider demand shocks. I introduce
a shock to preferences as proposed by Smets and Wouters (2003). More precisely, I
assume that the stochastic discount factor of households is time-varying:
ln βt = (1− ρβ) ln β + ρβ ln βt−1 + et,β,
where ρβ ∈ (0, 1) and et,β ∼ iid(0, 1).
Figure B.6: Stochastic discount factor shock
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Note: Blue dashed lines refer to the variables associated with the banking sector, whereas the red
circled lines refer to the bond sector. Black lines refer to the aggregates. Finance premia and the
bank loan’s share are reported in absolute deviations, the remaining variables are expressed in
percentage deviations.
The shock reduces consumption (not shown) and output and leads to the
crowding-in of investment. The investment boom is caused by a decline in capital
prices and finance premia. Given the good balance sheet positions of banks, they
extend credit to small firms, causing the ratio of bank loans to bonds to increase
initially. Over the medium term, the model reproduces a change in the bank loan
share similar to the one in the empirical model. Note that the declines in finance
premia match my empirical evidence on demand shocks.
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C.1 Welfare
The welfare measure is given by the lifetime household utility:
Welfare =
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Lt), (C.1)
with the period utility U(Ct, Lt) ≡
(
ln(Ct − hCt−1)− ψL1+φLL
1+φL
t
)
. To compute
the unconditional welfare measure, I take the unconditional expectation of lifetime
utility:
E[Welfare] = E
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1 + g)C¯, L¯)
=
1
1− β
(
ln((1 + g)(1− h)C¯)− ψL
1 + φL
L¯1+φL
)
where g denotes a fraction of steady-state consumption that makes agents in the
non-stochastic economy as well off as in the stochastic economy. The term g·100
C¯
represents welfare costs reported in table 4.2 and 4.4. I solve for g, by equating
the unconditional welfare in the deterministic steady state and in the stochastic
environment, as specified in equation C.1 . The latter welfare measure is computed
via the second order approximation of the model. A negative value of g indicates that
households are willing to give up a certain fraction of permanent consumption in
order to remain in the non-stochastic steady state relative to stochastic equilibrium
under certain policy regime. Or equivalently, negative welfare cost represents a
percentage decrease in steady state consumption necessary to make household
indifferent between the deterministic and stochastic environment.
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C.2 Impulse responses: Corporate debt compo-
sition
Figure C.1 depicts the reaction of the bank loans’ share, i.e., the measure of
corporate debt composition to aggregate shocks. Under simple Taylor rules, the
composition changes in favour of corporate bonds, as bond finance is less expensive
source of finance. The shift reverse in the presence of the bank credit policy. The
reason is that state intervention depresses bank premia, making bank finance
cheaper. Hence, the shift is reversed towards capital of small firms and bank finance
is illustrated in the increase in the bank loan share.
Figure C.1: Bank loan share
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Note: Green lines refer to the dynamics of the model economy with two sector-specific policy
instruments, whereas blue lines refer to the baseline model economy with the Taylor rule. The
bank loans’ share instruments are reported in absolute deviations from the steady state, in
percentage points. The remaining variables are reported in percentage deviations from the steady
state. Horizontal axes display quarters after the shock.
Bibliography
Adrian, T., Colla, P., and Shin, H. (2012). Which financial frictions? Parsing the
evidence from the financial crisis of 2007-9. Working Paper 18335, National
Bureau of Economic Research. 2, 24, 43, 49, 90
Bailliu, J., Meh, C., and Zhang, Y. (2015). Macroprudential rules and monetary
policy when financial frictions matter. Economic Modelling, 50:148 – 161. 4, 53,
54, 63, 72
Bassett, W., Chosak, M., Driscoll, J., and Zakrajˇsek, E. (2014). Changes in bank
lending standards and the macroeconomy. Journal of Monetary Economics,
62:23–40. 8
Basu, S., Fernald, J., and Kimball, M. (2006). Are technology improvements
contractionary? American Economic Review, 96(5):1418–1448. 22
Becker, B. and Ivashina, V. (2014). Cyclicality of credit supply: Firm level evidence.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 62:76–93. 24
Bekaert, G., Hoerova, M., and Duca, M.˜L. (2013). Risk, uncertainty and mone-
tarypolicy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 60:771–788. 2
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., and Gilchrist, S. (1999). The financial accelerator in
a quantitative business cycle framework. Handbook of Monetary Economics,
1(C):1341 – 1393. Edited by John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford. 1, 3, 5, 10,
11, 12, 18, 19, 23, 25, 29, 34, 41, 47, 55, 59, 95
Bjørnland, H.˜C. and Leitemo, K. (2009). Identifying the interdependence between
US monetary policy and the stock market. Journal of Monetary Economics,
56(2):275 – 282. 9
Borio, C. and Zabai, A. (2016). Unconventional monetary policies: a re-appraisal.
Technical Report 570, BIS Working Papers. 52
Brzoza-Brzezina, M., Kolasa, M., and Makarski, K. (2013). The anatomy of
standard dsge models with financial frictions. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 37(1):32 – 51. 1, 10, 12, 13, 83, 84, 85
102
BIBLIOGRAPHY 103
Brzoza-Brzezina, M., Kolasa, M., and Makarski, K. (2015). Macroprudential policy
and imbalances in the euro area. Journal of International Money and Finance,
51(C):137–154. 53
Calvo, G.˜A. (1983). Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 12(3):383 – 398. 32
Canova, F. and Nicolo´, G.˜D. (2002). Monetary disturbances matter for business
fluctuations in the G-7. Journal of Monetary Economics, 49(6):1131 – 1159. 9
Canova, F. and Paustian, M. (2011). Business cycle measurement with some theory.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(4):345 – 361. 11, 13, 20
Cantillo, M. and Wright, J. (2000). How do firms choose their lenders? An empirical
investigation. Review of Financial Studies, 13(1):155–189. 28, 55
Carlstrom, C., Fuerst, T., Ortiz, A., and Paustian, M. (2014). Estimating contract
indexation in a financial accelerator model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 46:130–149. 10, 12, 13, 83, 84
Carrillo, J., Mendoza, E., Nuguer, V., and Rolda´n-Pen˜a, J. (2017). Tight money-
tight credit: Coordination failure in the conduct of monetary and financial policies.
Working Paper 23151, National Bureau of Economic Research. 79
Christensen, I. and Dib, A. (2008). The financial accelerator in an estimated New
Keynesian model. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11:155–178. 7, 10, 11, 14, 18,
83, 84
Christiano, L., Motto, R., and Rostagno, M. (2010). Financial factors in economic
fluctuations. Working Paper Series 1192, European Central Bank. 8, 10, 12, 13,
14, 34, 83, 84, 95
Christiano, L., Motto, R., and Rostagno, M. (2014). Risk shocks. American
Economic Review, 104(1):27–65. 1, 8, 34, 40, 41, 64
Colla, P., Ippolito, F., and Li, K. (2013). Debt specialization. Journal of Finance,
68(5):2117–2141. 25, 28, 33, 53
Cu´rdia, V. and Woodford, M. (2010). Credit spreads and monetary policy. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 42:3–35. 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 54, 66, 70, 72,
83, 84
Cu´rdia, V. and Woodford, M. (2011). The central-bank balance sheet as an
instrument of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(1):54–79. 2,
3, 5, 53, 54, 65, 75
104 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dedola, L., Karadi, P., and Lombardo, G. (2013). Global implications of national
unconventional policies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(1):66 – 85. 37, 43,
53, 58
DeFiore, F. and Uhlig, H. (2011). Bank finance versus bond finance. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 43(7):1399–1421. 25, 41
DeFiore, F. and Uhlig, H. (2015). Corporate debt structure and the financial crisis.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 47(8):1571–1598. 26, 28
DeGraeve, F. (2008). The external finance premium and the macroeconomy: US
post-WWII evidence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32(11):3415 –
3440. 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 19, 83, 84
Denis, D. and Mihov, V. (2003). The choice among bank debt, non-bank private
debt, and public debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings. Journal of
Financial Economics, 70(1):3–28. 41
Faia, E. and Monacelli, T. (2007). Optimal interest rate rules, asset prices, and
credit frictions. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31(10):3228–3254.
61
Fernald, J. (2012). A quarterly, utilization-adjusted series on total factor productiv-
ity. Technical report, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. FRBSF Working
Paper 2012-19 (updated March 2014). 22
Fornari, F. and Stracca, L. (2013). What does a financial shock do? First interna-
tional evidence. Technical report, European Central Bank. Working paper 1522.
13
Fuentes-Albero, C. (2014). Financial frictions, financial shocks, and aggregate
volatility. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-84, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). 39, 61
Furlanetto, F., Ravazzolo, F., and Sarferaz, S. (2014). Identification of financial
factors in economic fluctuations. Working Paper 09/2014, Norges Bank. 1, 7, 9,
11, 13, 14, 16, 20
Gal´ı, J. and Gambetti, L. (2015). The effects of monetary policy on stock market
bubbles: Some evidence. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1):233–
57. 15, 20
Gal´ı, J. and Rabanal, P. (2004). Technology shocks and aggregate fluctuations:
How well does the real business cycle model fit postwar U.S. data? In NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2004, volume˜14, pages 159–214. MIT Press. 22, 70
BIBLIOGRAPHY 105
Gambacorta, L. and Signoretti, F. (2014). Should monetary policy lean against the
wind? An analysis based on a DSGE model with banking. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 43:146 – 174. 72
Gambetti, L. and Musso, A. (2017). Loan supply shocks and the business cycle.
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 32(4):764–782. 3, 6, 13, 24, 43, 50
Gelain, P. and Ilbas, P. (2017). Monetary and macroprudential policies in an
estimated model with financial intermediation. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 78(C):164–189. 53, 79
Gerali, A., Neri, S., Sessa, L., and Signoretti, F. (2010). Credit and banking in a
DSGE model of the euro area. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42:107–141.
1, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 23, 45, 83, 84
Gertler, M. and Karadi, P. (2011). A model of unconventional monetary policy.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(1):17–34. 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19,
23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 36, 37, 40, 41, 45, 49, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 70, 83,
84, 95
Gertler, M., Kiyotaki, N., and Queralto, A. (2012). Financial crises, bank risk
exposure and government financial policy. Journal of Monetary Economics,
59:S17 – S34. 4, 53, 70, 73
Gertler, M. and Lown, C. (2000). The information in the high yield bond spread
for the business cycle: Evidence and some implications. Working Paper 7549,
National Bureau of Economic Research. 6, 8
Gilchrist, S., Schoenle, R., Sim, J., and Zakrajˇsek, E. (2014). Inflation dynamics
during the financial crisis. Manuscript. 20
Gilchrist, S. and Zakrajˇsek, E. (2012). Credit spreads and business cycle fluctuations.
American Economic Review, 102(4):1692–1720. 1, 6, 8, 9, 16, 20, 26, 28, 82, 83
Gorton, G. and Winton, A. (2003). Chapter 8 - Financial Intermediation. In
George˜Constantinides, M.˜H. and Stulz, R., editors, Corporate Finance, volume
1, Part A of Handbook of the Economics of Finance, pages 431 – 552. Elsevier.
25, 29
Hristov, N., Hu¨lsewig, O., and Wollmersha¨user, T. (2012). Loan supply shocks
during the financial crisis: Evidence for the Euro area. Journal of International
Money and Finance, 31:569–592. 6, 13
Jermann, U.˜J. and Quadrini, V. (2007). Stock market boom and the productivity
gains of the 1990s. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(2):413 – 432. 22
106 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kaihatsu, S. and Kurozumi, T. (2014). Sources of business fluctuations: Financial
or technology shocks? Review of Economic Dynamics, 17(2):224 – 242. 5
Kannan, P., Rabanal, P., and Scott, A. (2012). Monetary and macroprudential policy
rules in a model with house price booms. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics,
12(1):1–44. 53, 63
Kashyap, A., Stein, J., and Wilcox, D. (1996). Monetary policy and credit conditions:
Evidence from the composition of external finance: Reply. American Economic
Review, 86(1):310–14. 24, 26, 27, 49
Lan, H. and Meyer-Gohde, A. (2013). Solving DSGE models with a nonlinear
moving average. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 37(12):2643–2667.
75
Lucas, R. (1987). Models of business cycles: By Robert E. Lucas. Basil Blackwell
Oxford. 61
Lucas, R. (2003). Macroeconomic Priorities. American Economic Review, 93(1):1–
14. 61
Meeks, R. (2012). Do credit market shocks drive output fluctuations? Evidence
from corporate spreads and defaults. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
36:568–584. 1, 6, 16
Meh, C. and Moran, K. (2010). The role of bank capital in the propagation of
shocks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(3):555–576. 10, 12, 13,
83, 84
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and
the theory of investmentauthor. American Economic Review, 48(3):261–297. 1
Oliner, S. and Rudebusch, G. (1996). Monetary policy and credit conditions: Evi-
dence from the composition of external finance: Comment. American Economic
Review, 86(1):300–309. 24, 26, 27, 49
Passmore, W. and von Hafften, A. (2017). Are Basel’s Capital Surcharges for
Global Systemically Important Banks Too Small? FEDS Notes 2017-02-27-1,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). 78
Peersman, G. and Straub, R. (2006). Putting the New Keynesian model to a test.
IMF Working Paper 06/135, International Monetary Fund. 9
Peersman, G. and Straub, R. (2009). Technology shocks and robust sign restriction
in a euro area svar. International Economic Review, 50:727–750. 11
BIBLIOGRAPHY 107
Peersman, G. and Wagner, W. (2014). Shocks to bank lending, risk-taking, securi-
tization, and their role for US business cycle fluctuations. Manuscript. 23
Quint, D. and Rabanal, P. (2014). Monetary and Macroprudential Policy in an
Estimated DSGE Model of the Euro Area. International Journal of Central
Banking, 10(2):169–236. 53, 63
Rauh, J. and Sufi, A. (2010). Capital structure and debt structure. Review of
Financial Studies, 23(12):4242–4280. 28, 33
Repullo, R. and Suarez, J. (2013). The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regula-
tion. Review of Financial Studies, 26(2):452–490. 78
Rubio-Ramı´rez, J., Waggoner, D., and Zha, T. (2010). Structural vector autore-
gressions: Theory of identification and algorithms for inference. The Review of
Economic Studies, 77(2):665–696. 7, 81
Schmitt-Grohe´, S. and Uribe, M. (2007). Optimal simple and implementable
monetary and fiscal rules. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(6):1702 – 1725.
62, 67
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2003). An estimated dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model of the euro area. Journal of the European Economic Association,
1(5):1123–1175. 98
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2007). Shocks and frictions in us business cycles: A
bayesian DSGE approach. American Economic Review, 67(3):586–606. 70
Taylor, J. (1993). Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 39:195 – 214. 53
Townsend, R. (1979). Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state
verification. Journal of Economic Theory, 21:265–293. 6
Uhlig, H. (2005). What are the effects of monetary policy on output? results from
an agnostic identification procedure. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(2):381
– 419. 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 81
Verona, F., Martins, M., and Drumond, I. (2013). (Un)anticipated monetary policy
in a DSGE model with a shadow banking system. International Journal of
Central Banking, 9:73–118. 40, 56, 64
Wieland, V., Cwik, T., Mu¨ller, G., Schmidt, S., and Wolters, M. (2012). A new
comparative approach to macroeconomic modeling and policy analysis. Journal
of Economic Behavior Organization, 83(3):523 – 541. The Great Recession:
motivation for re-thinking paradigms in macroeconomic modeling. 83
108 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary
Policy. Princeton University Press. 66

Selbststa¨ndigkeitserkla¨rung
Ich versichere, die von mir vorgelegte Dissertation selbsta¨ndig und ohne unerlaubte
Hilfe und Hilfsmittel angefertigt, sowie die benutzten Quellen und Daten anderen
Ursprungs als solche kenntlich gemacht zu haben.
Ich bezeuge durch meine Unterschrift, dass meine Angaben u¨ber die bei der
Abfassung meiner Dissertation benutzten Hilfsmittel, u¨ber die mir zuteil gewordene
Hilfe sowie u¨ber fru¨here Begutachtungen meiner Dissertation in jeder Hinsicht der
Wahrheit entsprechen.
Berlin, 5. Juli 2017
Jelena Zˇivanovic´
